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ARTICLE
REFRACTORY PAIN, EXISTENTIAL SUFFERING,
AND PALLIATIVE CARE: RELEASING AN
UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING
George P. Smith, II*
Since the beginning of the hospice movement in 1967, “total pain
management” has been the declared goal of hospice care.  Palliating the
whole person’s physical, psychosocial, and spiritual states or conditions
is central to managing the pain that induces suffering.  At the end-stage
of life, an inextricable component of the ethics of adjusted care requires
recognition of a fundamental right to avoid cruel and unusual suffering
from terminal illness.  This Article urges wider consideration and use of
terminal sedation, or sedation until death, as an efficacious palliative
treatment and as a reasonable medical procedure in order to safeguard
the “right” to a dignified death.
Once the state establishes a human right to avoid refractory pain of
whatever nature in end-stage illness, a coordinate responsibility must be
assumed by health care providers to make medical judgments consistent
with preserving the best interests of a patient’s quality of life by alleviat-
ing suffering.  The principle of medical futility is the preferred construct
for implementing this professional responsibility.
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Rather than continue to be mired in the vexatious quagmire of the
doctrine of double effect—all in an effort to “test” whether end-stage
decisions by health care providers are licit or illicit—a relatively simple
test of proportionality, or cost-benefit analysis, is proffered.  Imbedded,
necessarily, in this equation is the humane virtue of compassion, charity,
mercy or agape.
Assertions of state interest in safeguarding public morality by re-
stricting intimate associational freedoms to accelerate death in a termi-
nal illness are suspicious, if, indeed, not invalid.  No terminally ill
individual suffering from either intractable somatic or non-somatic pain,
or both, should be forced to continue living.
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“Dying is an integral part of life, as natural and
predictable as being born.”  Elisabeth Kübler-Ross1
“[A]dequate relief for severe and continuing pain is
unusual in the modern hospital.”  Eric Cassell2
“[I]t hath been often said that it is not Death, but
Dying which is terrible.”  Henry Fielding3
INTRODUCTION
A. Total Pain Management and Hospice Care
The concept of existential pain has existed in various forms
throughout mankind’s history.  Long before Søren Kierkegaard first tack-
led the issue,4 often termed today as psychological distress or suffering,5
the reality of such a dimension of pain at death was perhaps first re-
corded when Jesus Christ, in contemplating his own death, stated, “I am
deeply grieved, even to . . . death.”6  No doubt, Edvard Munch’s famous
painting, “The Scream,” may well be taken as the most profound artistic
1 ELISABETH KÜBLER-ROSS, DEATH: THE FINAL STAGE OF GROWTH 5 (Prentice Hall
1975) (1974).
2 ERIC J. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND THE GOALS OF MEDICINE 286 (2d
ed. 2004).
3 HENRY FIELDING, AMELIA 109 (Martin C. Battestin ed., Wesleyan University Press
1983) (1751).
4 SøREN KIEERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING (1843); SøREN KIEERKEGAARD THE
SICKNESS UNTO DEATH (1849).
5 See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 12 (1985).
6 Mark 14:34 (International Standard Version).  Luke also records Jesus, prior to his
crucifixion, expressing anxiety and distress for what he knows is to be his fate, when he asks,
“Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless, not my will, but thine be
done.” Luke 22:42 (King James).
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depiction of existential suffering ever rendered in oil.7  Indeed, it has
been recognized as capturing an “intense state of anxiety and despair”
where “loss of identity becomes death.”8  While art confers an unmistak-
able visibility on distress in its varied complex forms, literature rarely
captures it adequately, as there is no language for it—pain simply “re-
sists verbal objectification.”9
Without question, pain plays havoc with the human psyche and in-
duces suffering which, if lacking meaning, can destroy.10  Indeed, deny-
ing the impact of “suffering is to trivialize another person’s experience,
to diminish its scope and lessen its significance.”11  Once it can be shown
that there is a right to compassionate care—as this Article advocates—
7 See Arthur G. Lipman, The Scream by Edvard Munch: A Profound Portrayal of Exis-
tential Pain, 19 J. PAIN & PALLIATIVE CARE PHARMACOTHERAPY 1, 1–2 (2005); see generally
REINHOLD HELLER, EDVARD MUNCH: THE SCREAM (John Fleming & Hugh Honour eds., 1973)
(discussing the artistic attributes of Munch’s painting).
8 HELLER, supra note 7, at 90. R
9 SCARRY, supra note 5, at 12.  Thomas Mann opined that within the body of literature, R
however, no piece is to be found which is not concerned with suffering of some permutation.
See id.  For Emily Dickinson, the most overwhelming of all bodily experiences was pain.  She
captured this feeling in a forty-one word poem entitled, “The Mystery of Pain”:
Pain has an Element of Blank;
It cannot recollect
When it began, or if there were
A day when it was not.
It has no future but itself,
Its infinite realms contain
Its past, enlightened to perceive
New Periods of pain.
EMILY DICKINSON, THE COLLECTED POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 16 (Barnes & Noble Classics
Series, 2003) (1890).
The courts view pain and suffering as inseparable although the concepts are, in fact,
different.  Acute pain—as a manifestation of a medical problem or disease—subsides usually
within one month to six as part of the healing process.  Pain may also be classified as chronic
or within a collateral category of a chronic pain syndrome—with both of these types having
long lasting and residual psychological structural defects different from acute episodes of pain.
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 419–20 (2003).
In the practice of medicine, pain—of which there are fifty-eight types—is defined as “an
unpleasant sensory and emotional experience arising from actual or potential tissue damage or
described in terms of such damage.” TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1487,
1487–91 (19th ed. 2001).  Psychogenic pain is used to describe mental pain—as opposed to
pain of an organic nature. Id. at 1491.  Suffering, being subjective, cannot be measured but
must be referenced to the whole person.  Accordingly, suffering is defined as a “state of severe
distress associated with events that threaten the intactness of [the] person.” CASSELL, supra
note 2, at 276, 312.  Pain affects the body and is more properly addressed by physicians.  Yet, R
a shared responsibility exists between physicians and other caregivers to control both the pain
and suffering of those who are dying.  Eric J. Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of
Medicine, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 639 (1982).
10 See Richard B. Gunderman, Is Suffering the Enemy?, 32 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 40, 43
(2002); see generally DAVID B. MORRIS, THE CULTURE OF PAIN (1991) (describing historical
and artistic portrayals that depict the magnitude of human pain and suffering).
11 Gunderman, supra note 10, at 43–44. R
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accepting and validating this new right will, necessarily, trigger a coordi-
nating duty to make judgments relative to one’s quality of life in order to
assess the extent of one’s suffering.  In a very real way, then, a right of
compassionate care will embrace and incorporate this collateral duty to
prevent suffering.12  An ethic requiring “a provision for competent care”
is central to enforcing a right to compassionate care for terminal illness at
the end-stage of life.13  This ethic adjusts to a patient’s on-going medical
needs as their illness progresses, and in doing so, meets the fundamental
goal of medicine: to relieve suffering.14
Although existential pain has been defined as suffering “with no
clear connections to physical pain,” it has also been recognized as suffer-
ing which can in fact be expressed as physical pain.15  Existential pain is
seen today as a significant clinical factor which may either reinforce ex-
isting physical pain or even be the root cause of it.16
From the very beginnings of the hospice movement, led by Dame
Cicely Saunders of the United Kingdom in 1967,17 “total pain” manage-
ment of physical, psychosocial and spiritual suffering was then—and is
still today—the goal of hospice care.18  Palliating the whole person and
offering compassionate care19 is central to hospice care.20  Viewed as
such, palliative care presents an alternative not only to assisted suicide
and active, voluntary euthanasia, but to the compulsiveness of some
health care providers who forever press active “curative” care and treat-
ments when they are medically inappropriate or contra indicated.21  In
this regard, hospice care is an effort to counterbalance this irrational and
inhumane compulsiveness and thereby “humanize medicine.”22
Palliative care is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO)
as care that “improves the quality of life for patients and families who
12 See Lois L. Shepherd, Sophie’s Choice: Medical and Legal Responses to Suffering, 72
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 103, 146 (1996) [hereinafter Shepherd, Sophie’s Choice].
13 Id. at 138.
14 See CASSELL, supra note 2, at 291. R
15 Peter Strang et al., Existential Pain—an Entity, or Provocation, or a Challenge?, 27 J.
PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 241 (Mar. 2004).  In addition to Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Sartre and
Heidegger are recognized as the major philosophers leading the philosophical movement of
existentialism. See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (1962) (describing
Heidegger’s philosophical views on such issues as Being, temporality, and death).
16 See Strang et al., supra note 15, at 241. R
17 See Cicely Saunders, Hospice, 1 MORTALITY 317, 317, 329 (1996).
18 Id. at 320.
19 See HOSPICE: THE LIVING IDEA (Cicely Saunders et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter HOS-
PICE] ; see also Paul Torrens, Achievement, Failure and the Future: Hospice Analysed, in HOS-
PICE: THE LIVING IDEA 187, 187–94 (Cicely Saunders et al. eds., 1981).
20 Id.
21 See HOSPICE CARE ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE 11 (Dame Cicely Saunders & Rob-
ert Kastenbaum eds., 1997).
22 See id. at 7; see also Torrens, supra note 19, at 188–90. R
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face life-threatening illness, by providing pain and symptom relief, spiri-
tual and psychosocial support from diagnosis to the end of life, and be-
reavement.”23  Palliating the whole person, then, requires medicine to
attend more fully to the phenomenon of existential pain.  For this to be
efficacious, health care decision makers must regularly reassess patient
treatment goals in order to not only learn how their patients define and
experience suffering, but the patients’ thresholds for tolerating various
sources of distress.  These thresholds are seen as being informed by a
patient’s personality, which has, in turn, been shaped by life experiences
and attitudes toward death management and quality of life in end-stage
illness.24
B. Medical Futility and Terminal Sedation
This Article asserts that palliative care should include an unencum-
bered option of respite, or what is also termed, terminal sedation, as a
compassionate response to suffering.  Leon R. Kass has argued that death
should never be sought or engineered as a “therapeutic option” to end
suffering.25  Yet, prolonged life-sustaining treatments often impose un-
due burdens or serve as futile roadblocks to one in the medically vali-
dated end-stage of life,26 thereby preventing as “comfortable” a death as
possible.27  Accordingly, in fulfilling their ethical mandate to prevent
pain and suffering, health care providers should standardize a protocol
which allows them—with patient or family approval or when a patient is
unconscious and without proxy decision maker—to take those reasona-
23 Palliative Care, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/cancer/palliative/en (last
visited Feb. 25, 2011); see also Jan Stjernsward, The International Hospice Movement from
the Perspective of The World Health Organization, in HOSPICE CARE ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SCENE 21 (Cicely Saunders & Robert Kastenbaum eds. 1997).
24 See Martin J. Fegg et al., Personal Values and Individual Quality of Life in Palliative
Care Patients, 30 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 154 (2005); Helene Stacks et al., Why Now?
Timing and Circumstances of Hastened Deaths, 30 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 215, 225
(2005).
25 Leon R. Kass, Lingering Longer: Who Will Care?, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2005, at
A23.
26 See JOANNE LYNN, SICK TO DEATH AND NOT GOING TO TAKE IT ANYMORE! 12 (2004).
27 Id.; see Len Doyal, Dignity in Dying Should Include the Legalization of Non-Volun-
tary Euthanasia, 1 CLINICAL ETHICS 65 (2006) (arguing under a best interests test, that it is
beneficial and compassionate to end the suffering of incompetent patients experiencing intrac-
table physical and emotional suffering from terminal illness with abbreviated life expectancy
and unable to either conceptualize or, for that matter, demand assistance in ending life); see
also Nigel Bunyan, I Helped Patients Die, Says Murder Case G.P., DAILY TELEGRAPH, June
19, 2010, at 1 (reporting on a seventy-five year-old physician, Dr. Harold Martin, who admit-
ted hastening the death of three patients—for whom he had been charged with murder and was
acquitted subsequently; he also admitted later that he had given fatal doses of painkillers to
elderly and terminally ill patients, and in two cases without patient consent, acting as such, out
of “Christian compassion” to limit suffering); see generally DAVID B. MORRIS, THE CULTURE
OF PAIN (1991) (discussing the history of medical developments and attitudes toward treating
pain).
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ble steps to relieve unremitting pain and discomfort.28  The thesis of this
Article is that law and medicine must agree on set standards or protocols
which allow for the use of terminal sedation as an efficacious and com-
passionate practice for the end-stage treatment of patients.
Existing medicolegal and ethical norms allow, in limited circum-
stances, the terminal sedation of a dying patient.29  It is acceptable and
even compassionate to sedate a patient in terminal distress when this ac-
tion is taken to either “produce unconsciousness before extubation,” to
relieve physical suffering when standard palliative care does not abate
refractory symptoms, and possibly when nonphysical suffering is sought
to be relieved.30  Yet, in order for a physician to engage in terminal seda-
tion, he must not intend to end the life of his patient.31  Rather, if a
patient dies from high dosages of sedating medications, a physician must
give medication with the intent to relieve pain rather than cause death—
although death is a foreseeable risk.32  This is known as the doctrine of
double effect, a well-established and nearly universally accepted princi-
ple of medical ethics and related law.33
Troublesome as the doctrine of double effect is as a construct for
discerning physician intent, the American Medical Association—through
its Council on Ethics and Judicial Affairs—still clings to the doctrine as
determinative in justifying the use of terminal sedation.34
This Article proposes that, rather than have medico-legal decision-
making mired, compulsively, in efforts to discern and validate positive
subjective intentions for use of terminal sedation by a physician, a medi-
cal decision is made—based on accepted medical judgment—by weigh-
ing the costs of treatment directly against its benefits.35
28 See infra notes 189–200. R
29 See Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas, III, The Legal Bounds of Physician
Conduct Hastening Death, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 139 (2000).
30 Glenys Williams, The Principle of Double Effect and Terminal Sedation, 9 MED. L.
REV. 41, 42 (2001).
31 See generally T.A. CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT REASONING: DOING GOOD AND
AVOIDING EVIL (2006) (describing the necessary elements within the principle of double ef-
fect); Norman L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of
Death and Dying, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 182 (2001) (observing the differences in developing
attitudes toward end-of-life treatment after In re Quinlan, which held in 1976 that a competent
patient may reject life-saving medical treatment).
32 Victor Cellarius, Terminal Sedation and the Imminence Condition, 34 J. MED. ETHICS
69 (2008).
33 See Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect, 90
ETHICS 527 (1980) [hereinafter Boyle, Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect].
34 See infra note 203 and accompanying text. R
35 See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.  It is within the last two years of life R
that most medicine is used for Americans with chronic illness (diabetes, cancer, heart disease)
who require hospital care.  Robert Pear, Researchers Find Huge Variations in End-of-Life
Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2008, at 17.  As a consequence of this statistic, almost a third
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C. Common Sense and Compassion
Wider acceptance and use of terminal sedation as a valid method of
palliative treatment presents an important opportunity to more fully un-
derstand the issues of managing death.  It also provides an equal opportu-
nity for viewing this medical procedure as a compromise to the equally
vexatious issue of physician-assisted suicide.36 Taxonomical confusion
abounds when issues of self-determination are presented in end-stage ill-
ness.37  There is also, oftentimes, a tragic absence of explicit policies
which enunciate clearly the extent to which care may be provided to the
terminally ill.38
The voluntary cessation of nutrition and hydration and the use of
terminal sedation are acknowledged as legal and accepted widely in hos-
pice care management.39  Because of an absence of clear protocols for
the administration of terminal sedation, and attendant moral objections
of Medicare monies expended go to patients in their last two years.  Evan Thomas, The Case
for Killing Granny: Re-thinking End-of-Life Care, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 2009, at 34, 39.
36 See Rob McStay, Terminal Sedation: Palliative Care for Intractable Pain, Post
Glucksberg and Quill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 45 (2003); see generally George P. Smith, II,
Terminal Sedation as Palliative Care: Revalidating a Right to a Good Death, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 382 (1998) (advocating terminal sedation as a means to treat end-of-life
suffering) [hereinafter Smith, Terminal Sedation].
37 See George P. Smith, II, All’s Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted
Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 283,
418–19 (1989).  Indeed, the terms “palliative sedation,” “continuous deep sedation,” and “pri-
mary deep continuous sedation,” are all used interchangeably, with terminal sedation and are
seen as euphemisms which mask the reality of finality which is inherent when terminal seda-
tion is administered.  “Death over days” is seen as feeling “more natural” than physician as-
sisted suicide.  Margaret P. Battin, Terminal Sedation: Pulling the Sheet Over Our Eyes, 38
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 27, 28 (2008).  Once a terminal prognosis has been given, a concern then
arises as to whether sedation should be administered within hours or days of death.  There is
no standard time-frame protocol.  If sedation is administered within two weeks or less, typi-
cally the patient dies from the underlying disease rather than the sedation.  Jeffrey T. Berger,
Rethinking Guidelines for the Use of Palliative Sedation, 40 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32
(May–June, 2010); see generally George P. Smith, II, Euphemistic Codes and Tell-Tale
Hearts: Humane Assistance in End-of-Life Cases, 10 HEALTH MATRIX, J. L.-MED. 175 (2000)
(urging hospitals to respect a patient’s Do Not Resuscitate order and honor their requests for
treatment, or lack thereof).
38 See Timothy E. Quill et al., Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison of Volun-
tarily Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Vol-
untary Active Euthanasia, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 2099, 2104 (1997).  In 2008, the Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association issued a report entitled,
Sedation to Unconsciousness in End-of-Life Cases, which hoped to bring clarity to this area of
concern.  Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Sedation to Unconsciousness in End-of-Life
Cases, AM. MED. ASS’N (2008), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/
code-medical-ethics/2201a.pdf.  Many of the Council’s conclusions have been termed “naive.”
See Battin, supra note 37.  For a more complete analysis of the Council’s Report, see infra R
notes 203–18 and accompanying text. R
39 See Quill et al., supra note 38, at 2103. R
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and legal concerns regarding the consequences of ordering its use, medi-
cal treatment of this nature is not readily available.40
Although illegal in all states but Oregon41 and Washington,42 physi-
cian-assisted suicide is difficult to prosecute successfully when requested
by a competent and informed patient.43  Voluntary euthanasia is also ille-
gal in most states and, if uncovered, likely to be prosecuted.44  Because
of this legal situation, a vast underground flourishes, which assists not
only in the practice of physician-assisted suicide but in voluntary
euthanasia.45
Although physician-assisted death is not considered a substantive
liberty interest and a fundamental right,46 just as palliative care is not
seen as a right incorporated into a lofty constitutional principle,47 this
Article argues that both actions coalesce into actuating a right to be free
40 Id.  Elucidating on what he terms “the last options” for dealing with refractory pain
not managed effectively by traditional palliative care, Dr. Quill makes pointed observations:
aggressive pain management achieved by the use of opiates, proportional to their need to
manage pain, is valid—even though there is an awareness (without purposeful intent) that
death will be hastened; withdrawing or withholding of life sustaining therapies is a legal right
for a competent patient to exercise; a voluntary decision by such a competent patient to cease
nutrition and hydration is a valid treatment option but be an informed division to the degree
that the patient understands the act of dying may take up to two weeks and physician support is
essential; finally, in rare cases where none of these three medical options are considered rea-
sonable, a disproportionate use of a sedative may be allowed to induce unconsciousness and
abate pain.  Timothy E. Quill, Physician-Assisted Death in the United States: Are the Existing
‘Last Resorts’ Enough?, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 17 (Sept.–Oct. 2008) [hereinafter Quill, Phy-
sician-Assisted Death].  While reliable statistics on the use of these options are difficult to
obtain and validate, one sets the use of sedation to unconsciousness anywhere from no deaths,
less than one percent, to half of all deaths. Id. at 20.
41 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800 (West 2003).
42 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. Ch. 70,245 (West 2010).  The Supreme Court of Montana
ruled on December 31, 2009, that—under the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50–9–101 to –206 (1991))—competent, terminally ill patients can request physician
assistance in obtaining a prescription for a lethal dose of medicine to be self-administered; and
further the Act shields physicians from civil or criminal liability for any such acts of assis-
tance. See Baxter v. State, 2009 Mont. LEXIS 695 (Dec. 31, 2009); infra note 316. R
43 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. Ch. 70,245 (West 2009); Quill et al., supra note 38, at 2103. R
But see Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Lethal
Flaws of the Ninth and Second Circuit Decisions 85 CAL. L. REV. 371, 405 (1997) (question-
ing whether deep, or terminal, sedation is the same as physician assisted suicide).
44 Quill et al., supra note 38, at 2104.  Voluntary euthanasia occurs in those cases where R
a clearly competent person makes a voluntary and enduring request to be helped to end his life.
Voluntary Euthanasia, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/eu-
thanasia-voluntary (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
45 Quill et al., supra note 38, at 2104; see generally ROGER S. MAGNUSSON, ANGELS OF R
DEATH: EXPLAINING THE EUTHANASIA UNDERGROUND (2002) (discussing doctors’ and pa-
tients’ views on, and the sometimes-tacit approval of, assisted dying, particularly with regard
to HIV patients).
46 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997).
47 McStay, supra note 36, at 60. But see Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks— R
Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1234 (1997).
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from intolerable and unmanageable pain and suffering—a right which
the U.S. Supreme Court has said exists48 and is grounded in the essential
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.49
Rather than continue to be overwhelmed with vexatious and often
contrived issues, what should be uppermost is—in cases of intractable
end-stage terminal suffering—a rational approach to legal decision mak-
ing.50  This approach should be guided by what, clinically, is judged to
be in the best interests of the patient in order to maintain his dignity and
comfort and promote a standard of beneficence during his final days.51
Perfect solutions for clinical dilemmas do not exist, nor can
medicine sanitize death.  When pain is refractory and unremitting, suffer-
ing follows despite efforts to palliate a patient’s medical condition; ter-
minal sedation and the voluntary refusal of nutrition and hydration
although “imperfect,” are valid courses of action to follow and have the
ultimate effect of enhancing patient autonomy.52
Interestingly, up to ninety percent of pain can be controlled by
analgesics.53  Yet, for the fifteen to thirty-five percent of hospice care
patients who suffer severe pain during their last week of life (with
twenty-five percent experiencing unbearable shortness of breath), the
ninety percent statistical success is unimpressive.54  Indeed, previous
48 McStay, supra note 36, at 60. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); George J. R
Annas, The Bell Tolls for a Constitutional Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1098, 1102 (Oct. 9, 1997) (observing that five members of the Vacco Court “seem to
think there is something akin to a ‘right not to suffer’ at least when death is imminent,” and
when palliative care is provided by physicians whose primary intention is to relieve suffering);
GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FINAL EXITS: SAFEGUARDING SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO
BE FREE FROM CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT (1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter
SMITH, FINAL EXITS].
49 Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 at 286–87 (1990); see also McStay,
supra note 36, at 49.  The Supreme Court has not given clear criteria for deciding when a right R
qualifies as a liberty interest.  Accordingly, the right to die with assistance is best decided by
state legislatures, prosecutors’ offices, hospitals and private homes; for it is within these fora
that the right is best tested and, when needed, acknowledged as legitimate.  It should be
remembered that even though there may be no constitutional foundation for a right to commit
an act, this—alone—does not mean that, morally, the act is itself improper.  Cass Sunstein,
The Right to Die, 106 YALE L. J. 1123, 1156–57 n.151 (1997).
50 George P. Smith, II, Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility: Safeguarding Au-
tonomy and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 1 (1996) [hereinafter Smith, Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility].
51 See LYNN, supra note 26, at 12. R
52 Timothy E. Quill & Ira R. Byock, Responding to Intractable Terminal Suffering: The
Role of Terminal Sedation and Voluntary Refusal of Food and Fluids, 132 ANNALS OF INTER-
NAL MED. 408, 413 (2000).
53 DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXITS 134 (1991).
54 Quill & Byock, supra note 52. R
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scholarship reported significant pain in as high as fifty percent of end-
stage patients.55
Rather than investigate the linguistic, moral, and philosophical am-
biguities inherent in the voluntary cessation of nutrition and hydration,
terminal sedation, physician-assisted suicides, and voluntary active eu-
thanasia,56 this Article advances the hypothesis that there is an inextrica-
ble component or commonality to evaluating and implementing each of
these four actions designed to hasten a humane death: namely, common
sense and compassion.  This policy is rooted in the biomedical principle
of beneficence,57 which is tied to the notion that there is a human right to
compassionate care in end-of-life illness58—with suffering being seen,
properly, to include physical and psychological distress.59  The proper or
controlling inquiry to be made with any of these four actions is, quite
simply, whether these procedures are consistent with sound medical
practice and thus whether it is in the best medical interests of the patients
to relieve either end-stage physical or mental suffering, or both.  Stated
otherwise, the overarching strategic issue and, indeed, the conclusion to
be reached is, to the extent to which any of these courses of action is a
proportional response to patient suffering, they should be viewed legally
and medically as proper acts of compassion and efficacious forms of re-
lieving intractable end-stage pain and suffering.
D. Codifying Clinical Epidemiologies
With enlightened clinical policies or protocols setting forth stan-
dards for the use of terminal or respite sedation as a proportional re-
sponse to the suffering associated with end-stage illness, palliative care
will lose the shackles of being bound unnecessarily to the principle of
double effect, and thereby broaden its focus and application.  Rather than
question the integrity of terminal sedation, its wider acceptance is com-
55 See Quill et al., supra note 38, at n.1, 5, 7; see also Editorial, Attending to Psychologi- R
cal Symptom and Palliative Care, 20 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 624 (Feb. 2001) (concluding
more than one-third of dying patients are depressed).
56 See Quill et al., supra note 38; McStay, supra note 36; see also Lynn A. Jansen & R
Daniel P. Sulmasy, Sedation, Alimentation, Hydration, and Equivocation: Careful Conversa-
tion About Care at the End of Life, 136 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 845 (2002).
57 See Albert R. Jonsen, A History of Bioethics and Discipline and Discourse, in
BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 3–22 (Nancy C.
Jecker, Albert R. Jonsen & Robert A. Pearlman eds. 2007); see also JOHN FLETCHER, SITUA-
TION ETHICS: THE NEW MORALITY (1966); John Fletcher, Love is The Only Measure, 83 COM-
MONWEALTH 427 (1966).
58 DAVID C. THOMASMA & GLENN C. GRABER, EUTHANASIA: TOWARD AN ETHICAL SO-
CIAL POLICY 192 (1991).
59 McStay, supra note 36, at 46; see Greg A. Sachs, Dying from Dementia, 361 NEW R
ENG. J. MED. 1595 (2009).
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patible with the principle of adjusted care60 for all medical treatment, and
a reasoned and compassionate response to managing medically futile
cases.61
Once terminal sedation is more widely accepted and used as a valid
medical procedure within the sound tenets of palliative care and made
more readily available to alleviate distress in end-stage illness, the next
step in broadening the impact of terminal sedation is to evaluate its valid-
ity in cases of nonterminal psychiatric illness.62  It is not within the scope
of analysis of this Article to investigate this issue in depth.  It is, how-
ever, important to make several observations that might well shape the
course of impending policy debates in order to resolve this issue.  Indeed,
the proper laws for structuring normative standards must continue to be
explored, debated, and subsequently refined over the succeeding years.
E. European Approaches to Psychogenic Pain
Interestingly, Belgium, the Netherlands,63 and—more recently—
Switzerland64 have allowed compassionate medical assistance in those
60 See THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 58, at 129.  Adjusted care is care adjusted, or R
suitable, to the progression of a medical condition.  Thus, palliative care would come at the
end-stage of a terminal illness while curative and rehabilitative care would be primary care at
the onset of illness. See M. Sapir, The Spectrum of Medical Care: Curative, Rehabilitative
and Palliative, 279 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 20 (1998); Sidney Wanzer et al., The Physician’s
Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A Second Look, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 844
(1989).  Continually adjusted care is essential to a compassionate and common sense approach
to the management of pain and suffering often encountered in the dying process.  Care of this
nature always strikes a balance in favor of pain relief—even though a potential exists for
hastening death—rather than the mere prolongation of life which is in its end-stage. THOM-
ASMA & GRABER, supra note 58, at 129.  In a very real way, this standard of care complements R
the Principle of Double Effect. See Boyle, Toward Understanding the Principle of Double
Effect, supra note 33; Cellarius, supra note 32; Quill et al., supra note 38, at 2101; supra notes R
222–27. R
61 Smith, Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility, supra note 50, at 38; see gener- R
ally Lauren Shaiova, Case Presentation: “Terminal Sedation” and Existential Distress, 16 J.
PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 463 (1998) (describing a case study where a patient’s pain manage-
ment resulted in effective quadriplegia, and terminal sedation provided a way to calm her
psychological distress).
62 See JOHN GRIFFITHS, HELEN WEYERS & MAURICE ADAMS, EUTHANASIA AND LAW IN
EUROPE 45 (2008); MARY WARNOCK & ELISABETH MACDONALD, EASEFUL DEATH: IS THERE A
CASE FOR ASSISTED DYING? 21–34 (2008).  In cases of advanced or end-stage dementia, the
prognosis should be properly seen as terminal and, thus, treated only with palliative care.
Sachs, supra note 59, at 1596. R
63 GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 62, at 51, 275.  In 2009, recent statistics showed that the R
number of people in Holland electing euthanasia was 2,636, or a thirtenn percent increase from
2,331 cases reported in 2008.  Simon Caldwell, Euthanasia Deaths on The Rise in Holland,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, June 20, 2010, at 17.
64 Jacob M. Appel, A Suicide Right for the Mentally Ill: A Swiss Case Opens the Debate,
37 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21 (May–June, 2007).  On November 3, 2006, the Swiss Federal
Supreme Court issued a ruling under which for the first time, assisted suicide is to be available
to psychiatric patients and others with mental illness who suffer from “incurable, permanent,
severe psychological disturbances” as well as to those with severe, long-term mental illness
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cases where nonterminal patients have endured a constant (or permanent)
level of mental suffering which qualifies as a chronic mental illness (e.g.,
manic/depressive or bipolar disorder) after years of “debilitating anxiety”
or even possibly the “agonies of rheumatoid arthritis.”65  In 1995, the
Royal Dutch Medical Association determined that no valid distinction is
to be drawn between physical and mental suffering.66  Yet, the Associa-
tion cautioned that in making medical evaluations of non-somatic ill-
nesses, great care and caution should be exercised in assessing both the
gravity and the depth of hopelessness consequential to the primary medi-
cal condition.67
Any policy developed from a right to rational self-determination
and thus, individual best interests, is also linked—inextricably—to the
responsibility of the medical profession to minimize suffering— with the
true extent being defined by each patient.  The doctrine of medical futil-
ity would have to be reshaped in order to accommodate assistance at this
who have made “rational” and “well considered” decisions to end their lives in order to avoid
further suffering. Id. at 21 n.4.
On February 25, 2010, the British, Crown Prosecution Service issued a document entitled,
Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging Assisting Suicide. See generally
Director of Public Prosecutions, Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or
Assisting Suicide, CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prose-
cution/assisted_suicide_policy.html [hereinafter CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE] .  Attempting
to resolve moral ambiguities in cases of assisted suicide and mercy killings, the guidelines
nonetheless fail to address not only the condition or degree of suffering the person requesting
the suicide is experiencing nor do they address the situation in which a patient is neither
terminally ill nor disabled but is suffering from severe depression or psychological distress.
See id.
The guidelines do not change the law prohibiting assisted suicide. See id.  Rather, they
provide guidance on which cases are likely to be prosecuted. See id.  They attempt to distin-
guish between “compassionate support” for which there would be a less likelihood of prosecu-
tion from cases of “malicious encouragement” which would be prosecuted. See id.  For an
analysis of the guidelines and the extent of their application, see Suzanne Ost, The De-Medi-
calisation of Assisted Dying: Is a Less Medicalised Model The Way Forward? 18 MEDICAL L.
REV. 497, 510–11 (2010) [hereinafter Ost, De-Medicalisation of Assisted Dying].
The first case investigation under these guidelines involved a seventy-nine year-old phy-
sician, Dr. Michael Irwin, who provided death management assistance to some twelve patients.
Although sufficient evidence was presented which could have provided a conviction under the
Suicide Act of 1961, it was determined that the public interest would not be served by prose-
cuting a senior physician who claimed that he acted with compassion—consistent with the
standards set under the assistance with suicide guidelines.  Martin Beckford, ‘Dr. Death’ Ruled
Too Old for Face Trial, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 26, 2010, at 4; see also Martin Beckford,
What the Law Says: Guidelines after The Purdy Case, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 26, 2010, at 4;
Aidan O’Neill, Assisted Suicide in the U.K.: From Crime to Right?, 40 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
(Inside back cover, unpaginated) (May–June, 2010).
65 Appel, supra note 64, at 21; see Joachim Cohen et al., European Public Acceptance of R
Euthanasia: Socio-demographic and Cultural Factors Assisted with the Acceptance of Eutha-
nasia in 33 European Countries, 63 SOC. SCI. & MED. 743 (2006).
66 MARGARET OTLOWSKI, VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND THE COMMON LAW 408, 409
(1997).
67 Id.
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level, since chronic mental illness is viewed today as totally separate
from a medical condition diagnosed as futile and resulting in death.68
Two primary concerns in any reevaluation of the feasibility of rede-
fining the use and limits of palliative care for nonterminal psychological
distress are the likelihood of cure from the mental illness and the compe-
tence of a mentally imbalanced patient to make a rational decision in
seeking humane assistance to hasten death.69  While agreements on time
frames of affliction for the full range of mental illnesses might be helpful
in determining nonterminal psychiatric illnesses that would qualify for
terminal assistance, it remains arguable whether a patient diagnosed with
a serious mental illness could ever be considered sufficiently competent
to make a decision to hasten death.  If new humane protocols for address-
ing the needs of those suffering from chronic psychotic distress are not
forthcoming, those afflicted with mental illness will remain condemned
to a form of lifetime incarceration where there is no palliative care.70
In the final analysis, the determinative question to be posited is “not
whether unbearable suffering is ever a justification for suicide but
whether it can ever justify the provision of assistance for someone else
who might not be able to bring it off unaided.”71  The bulwark of valid
normative action must be seen as anchored to the principle of
compassion.
68 See Appel, supra note 64.  While there is presently no consensus for palliative seda- R
tion to unconsciousness (PSU) when there is a primary level of existential suffering, it has
been suggested by one physician that where “severe existential pain” is exhibited “for which
all available and reasonable effective treatments are unacceptable to the patient,” PSU should
be recognized as a valid medical option.  Berger, supra note 37, at 32. R
69 See Appel, supra note 64.  Additional concerns in determining the competency of an R
individual to make rational decisions of this nature would include whether consideration of
this “final” alternative is of an impulsive nature; whether the decision is congruent with the
actual personal values of the distressed patient; and the extent to which there is any form of
coercion being extended upon the patient to decide one way or another.  An assessment of the
level of hopelessness associated with the medical condition at issue would also need to be
evaluated. See JAMES L. WERTH, JR., RATIONAL SUICIDE? IMPLICATIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS 63–65 (1996).
70 WARNOCK & MACDONALD, supra note 62, at 33, 34. R
71 Id. at 30. See THOMASMA & GRAEBER, supra note 58, at 193 (arguing that there R
should be a level of social responsibility to aid those enduring pain and suffering at death).
David H. Smith calls for the creation of supportive communities to be responsive to the needs
of the dying. See GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS (1989); see also AP Leader of Assisted Suicide Group Defends Work in Interview, D.C.
EXAMINER, Mar. 18, 2009, at 18 (reporting that the former President of the Final Exist Net-
work—charged with violating Georgia’s assisted suicide law—argued that competent individ-
uals suffering from medical conditions, such as a painful neurological condition accompanied
by breathing lapses, have a right to be guided and assisted in ending their lives).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\20-3\CJP302.txt unknown Seq: 15 29-MAR-11 12:52
2011] REFRACTORY PAIN, EXISTENTIAL SUFFERING 483
I. THE PARAMETERS OF PAIN
Led by the WHO, the International Association for the Study of
Pain and its European Federation for Pain Study, a Global Day Against
Pain was observed in October, 2004, in Geneva, Switzerland.72 This
event marked an intensified effort to establish the relief of pain as a ba-
sic, fundamental human right and the recognition of chronic pain as a
transnational health care issue.73
Recognizing that the physical and psychosocial etiology of chronic
pain sufferers manifests itself through a variety of conditions, including
depression, anxiety, fear, and even suicide,74 these three organizations
defined chronic pain as pain recurring for a period of more than three
months.75  The broad nature of this definition finds support in both Euro-
pean and American studies.  Not only do these studies disclose the sig-
nificant employment irregularities resulting from chronic pain
sufferers,76 but surveys of households in Europe and the United States
revealed that thirty-six percent of Europeans may be classified as chronic
pain sufferers, and in America, forty-three percent of all households had
members in chronic pain.77  That percentage for Americans translates
into a raw figure of eight million.  By 2030, this figure is expected to
double.78
Within this demographic is another projection that, if accurate,
presages even greater stress on health care resources for the elderly and
underscores the ultimate need for a system attuned to the needs of long-
term end-of-life care.  If, indeed, the over-65 population in the United
States will rise more than seventy percent between 2010 and 2030, while
payroll taxes for those within the general population rise, as predicted,
less than four percent, it is clear that planning efforts must be undertaken
presently in order to meet these systematic needs.79
Several organizations have made attempts to plan for the needs of
end-of-life patients.  The WHO has developed a three-step “ladder” for
cancer pain relief.  In summary, it states:
72 Arthur G. Lipman, Pain as a Human Right: The 2004 Global Day Against Pain, 19 J.
PAIN & PALLIATIVE CARE PHARMACOTHERAPY 85, 85 (2005).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 86.
75 Id. at 88.
76 Id. at 89.
77 Id. at 88.
78 BRUCE JENNINGS, ET AL., ACCESS TO HOSPICE CARE: EXPANDING BOUNDARIES, OVER-
COMING BOUNDARIES, HASTINGS CTR., (2003), at S50, available at http://www.thehastings
center.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Special_Reports/access_hospice_care.pdf.
79 Id. It is estimated that in order to support Medicare and Medicaid program costs,
payroll taxes must rise four percent. Id.
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If pain occurs, there should be prompt oral adminis-
tration of drugs in the following order: nonopioids (aspi-
rin and paracetamol); then strong opioids such as
morphine, until the patient is free of pain.  To calm fears
and anxiety, additional drugs— “adjuvants” —should be
used.  To maintain freedom from pain, drugs should be
given ‘by the clock,’ that is every 3—6 hours, rather
than ‘on demand.’  This three-step approach of adminis-
tering the right drug in the right dose at the right time is
inexpensive and 80-90% effective.  Surgical intervention
on appropriate nerves may provide further pain relief if
drugs are not wholly effective.”80
The President’s Council on Bioethics concluded in 2005 that the
basic standard for clinical decision-making should be one which pro-
motes the best patient care.81  This standard obviously must be continu-
ally adjusted as a patient’s case history progresses,82 and to promote
patient care anchored in mercy, compassion, beneficence, and loving
charity—care which recognizes that relief of pain is the most universal
moral obligation that a physician must uphold and that there is, indeed, a
right not to suffer.83
Psychological distress, or existential pain, however, is usually diffi-
cult to assess because evaluation requires special training and continual
contact with the patients’ families.84  There is a general societal aversion
to the obstacles faced in proving a patient’s emotional distress at end-of-
life care.85  Distinguishing between depression and psychological mor-
bidity is difficult because the sympathology of disrupted sleeping pat-
80 WHO’s Pain Ladder, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/cancer/palliative/
painladder/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
81 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN OUR
AGING SOCIETY 217 (2005), available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/tak-
ing_care/.  Best patient care is adjusted to the developing medical needs of the patient.  Essen-
tial to the standard of best care is acceptance of the “intrinsic dignity of persons” which, in
turn, mandates that the goal of providing care must be to enhance total patient well being
(somatic and non-somatic) and, at the end of life demonstrate beneficence, compassion, or
charity in managing pain and suffering. DAVID C. THOMASMA, HUMAN LIFE IN THE BALANCE
165, 184 (1990); see CASSELL, supra note 2; EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOM- R
ASMA, FOR THE PATIENT’S OWN GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN HEALTH CARE
(1988); see also THOMASMA & GRAEBER, supra note 58, for a discussion of the principle of R
adjusted care.
82 THOMASMA & GRAEBER, supra note 58, at 129. R
83 Id. at 192, 194 (quoting Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino).
84 Manish Agrawal & Ezekial J. Emmanuel, Attending to Psychologic Symptoms and
Palliative Care, 20 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 624 (Feb. 1, 2001).
85 Id.; see generally Paul Arnstein et al., Self Efficacy as a Mediator of The Relationship
between Pain Intensity, Disability and Depression in Chronic Pain Patients, 80 PAIN 483
(1999) (calling for further research after conducting a study which showed a possible connec-
tion between chronic pain and low self efficacy—doubts about one’s own abilities).
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terns, loss of energy, and lack of appetite are not exclusive response
mechanisms to psychological distress, but appear in cancer and other ter-
minal illnesses as well.86  Because of these difficulties and uncertainties,
the palliative management of existential pain has been largely
neglected.87
While no general “solutions” exist for meeting the existential needs
of terminally ill patients, attempts to meet these needs require careful
listening skills and defined lines of communication between health care
providers, patients, affected families, and proxy or surrogate decision-
makers.  Valid existential concerns are often obscured during palliative
care treatment.88  Even though a patient may have no absolute control
over the wide and varied spectra of suffering, the patient still has free-
dom to choose what attitude is taken toward that suffering.89  By ex-
tending end-of-life care to include psychiatric, psychological, existential
and spiritual issues—consistent with the WHO’s definition of palliative
care and its goal of addressing total patient needs90—a more complete,
compassionate, and realistic approach to managing terminal illness and
end-stage suffering would be implemented.91
A. Assessing Existential Suffering
The desire to hasten death arises because of a number of conditions:
inadequate pain management, psychological conditions ranging from de-
pression and hopelessness, to fears of loss of autonomy and physical
functioning,92 to futile and unbearable suffering, and avoidance of humil-
iation.93  All of these conditions conduce to one overriding fear: loss of
human dignity,94 which brings with it a fear of being forced to become
but a “passive bystander” to all of the normal functions of life.95  By
managing the dying process, which—for some—is viewed as too pro-
86 Put simply, the dying “do not have the luxury of clearly separating their physical
suffering from their psychological, spiritual, an existential suffering.”  Quill & Battin, infra
note 328, at 332; see also Agrawal & Emmanuel, supra note 84. R
87 Agrawal & Emmanuel, supra note 84. R
88 Ingrid Bolmsjö et al., Meeting Existential Needs in Palliative Care—Who, When, and
Why?, 18 J. PALLIATVE CARE 185 (2002).
89 William Breitbart, Christopher Gibson, Shannon Poppito & Amy Berg, Psychothera-
peutic Interventions at the End of Life: A Focus on Meaning and Spirituality, 49 CAN. J.
PSYCHIATRY 336 (June, 2004); see also GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1989).
90 See HOSPICE, supra note 19; SAUNDERS, supra note 21, at 320. R
91 Breitbart et al., supra note 89, at 371. R
92 Stacks et al., supra note 24, at 216. R
93 Gerrit Van der Wal & Robert J. M. Dillman, Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 308 BR.
MED. J. 1346 (1994).
94 HUMPHRY, supra note 53, at 135–36. R
95 Gunderman, supra note 10, at 40, 42. R
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tracted and filled with growing and multiple functional losses,96 the pa-
tient can exert some level of control over a process which is
acknowledged to be “by and large, a messy business.”97  Sadly, this com-
plicated and vexatious process for implementing the “new epidemiology
of dying”98 almost assures that health care providers will follow heroic
procedures which do not promote or sustain quality so much as postpone
death.99
In approximately twenty-five percent of all terminally ill patients,
depression and other mood disorders occur.100  Yet, interestingly, few
receive pharmacological aid through anti-depressant prescriptions.101  As
this Article shows, the main obstacle to a more liberal response to these
patients’ needs is the lack of clarity in determining when a distressed,
terminal patient is suffering from clinical depression or, instead, exhibit-
ing a “normal grief response” to the dying process.102  The components
of both of these syndromes are often vague, imprecise, and difficult to
evaluate.103  Commonly, when patients are obsessed with feelings of
worthlessness, lose their ability and desire to interact socially, and—in-
deed—lose their sense of hope, they are properly assessed as suffering
from clinical depression104 and should be given whatever dosage of
analgesis is deemed necessary to alleviate that condition—because
pharmacotherapy is ultimately the principal tool for symptom control.105
Another drawback to accurate and prompt evaluations of psycholog-
ical distress or existential suffering is often the inability of a physician or
palliative care management team to understand patient views about suf-
fering.  As a spiritual phenomenon, suffering is often accepted in Chris-
tian communities as a meaningful and authentic community response to
96 Stacks, supra note 24, at 216. R
97 SHERWIN B. NUTLAND, HOW WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE’S FINAL CHAPTER 142
(1994).
98 Id. at 12.
99 LYNN, supra note 26, at 164–65. R
100 Karel E. Miller, Stephen M. Adams & Martha M. Miller, Antidepressant Medication
Use in Palliative Care, 23 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 127 (No. 2, Mar.-April 2006).
101 Id.  Some other earlier studies have, however, shown that a number of terminally ill
cancer patients have—indeed—received sedation for psychological or mental agonies.  Tat-
suya Morita et al., Terminal Sedation for Existential Distress, 17 AM. J. HOSPICE AND PALLIA-
TIVE CARE 189, nn.4, 6–8.  A 1996 study done of experts on sedation in the U.K. and America
found that in twenty-two percent of cases evaluated, sedation was administered because of
patient “anguish” and in sixteen percent of cases, it was undertaken because of the “emotional,
psychological [or] spiritual distress” of those patients.  Susan Chater et al., Sedation for Intrac-
table Distress in the Dying—a Survey of Experts, 12 PALLIATIVE MED. 255 (1998).
102 Miller et al., supra note 100. R
103 Id.
104 Id. at 128.
105 Lipman, supra note 7, at 2. R
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Jesus Christ’s own suffering.106  In some faith communities, cultural ef-
forts are expended in order to view suffering—physically and men-
tally—as a positive, reinforcing value.107  Merely accepting suffering as
authentic, however, does not mean that it is also meaningful.108  It re-
mains for the physician to ascertain and then listen carefully to the spiri-
tual parameters within each patient’s character109 in an attempt to treat
those seriously ill as “whole persons.”110  In this way, the therapy is truly
patient-centered.111
Refractory existential suffering—or those symptoms which defy ad-
equate control despite all efforts to provide relief—is difficult to distin-
guish during the end stages of life from physical distress.112  Those
additional refractory symptoms most commonly reported as requiring
palliative sedation are: various degrees of agitation, restlessness or dis-
tress, confusion, respiratory distress, pain, and myoclonus (e.g., severe
twitching, jerking or uncontrollable shakes).113
Palliative sedation therapy is thus defined as “the use of sedative
medications to relieve intolerable and refractory distress by the reduction
in patient consciousness.”114  When patient suffering—physical or exis-
tential—becomes refractory to standard palliative therapies, the human,
106 Stan Van Hooft, The Meanings of Suffering, 28 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13 (1998); see
CASSELL, supra note 2, at 42–44; STANLEY HAURWAS, GOD, MEDICINE, AND SUFFERING, chs. R
II, III (1990); see also SHAPO, supra note 9 (discussing the legal position in assessing pain and R
suffering).
107 Van Hooft, supra note 106, at 14. R
108 Id. at 15.
109 See Seth M. Holmes et al., Screening the Soul: Communication Regarding Spiritual
Concerns Among Primary Care Physicians and Seriously Ill Patients Approaching the End of
Life, 23 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 25, 30 (2006).
110 Alton Hart, Jr. et al., Hospice Patients’ Attitudes Regarding Spiritual Discussion with
Their Donors, 20 AM J. HOSP. PALLIATIVE CARE 135 (2003).
111 Holmes et al., supra note 109, at 30; see generally A. B. Astro & Daniel P. Sulmasy, R
Spirituality and The Patient-Physician Relationship, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 2884 (2004)
(describing studies that focused on the importance and effects of faith and spirituality in cancer
patients).
112 Paul Rousseau, Existential Suffering and Palliative Sedation: A Brief Commentary
with a Proposal for Clinical Guidelines, 18 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE 151 (2001); see
James Halenbeck, Terminal Sedation for Intractable Distress: Not Slow Euthanasia but a
Prompt Response to Suffering, 171 WESTERN J. MED. 222 (Oct. 1999).
113 Bernard Lo & Gordon Rubenfeld, Palliative Sedation in Dying Patients: “We Turn to
It When Everything Else Hasn’t Worked”, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1810, 1811 (2005); see
generally Joseph W. Shega et al., Patients Dying with Dementia: Experience at the End of Life
and Impact on Hospice Care, 35 J. PAIN SYMPTOM MGMT. 499 (2008) (conducting a study that
showed patients with dementia who enroll in hospice programs may experience better end-of-
life care, though certain “nontreatable” symptoms still persist and cause the majority of dis-
tress for patients).
114 Tatsuya Morita et al., Definition of Sedation for Symptom Relief: A Systematic Litera-
ture Review and a Proposal For Operational Criteria, 24 J. PAIN SYMPTOM MGMT. 447
(2002).
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compassionate and merciful response is to offer terminal sedation.115
This approach to medical treatment may be seen as consistent with sound
principles of adjusted care.
B. Demoralization
It has been suggested that—in the clinical setting of hospice or pal-
liative care—a unique diagnostic category, termed the “demoralization
syndrome,” is becoming more recognizable and should be refined and
classified as a cognitive disorder.116 Seen as a “useful category of exis-
tential distress in which meaningless predominates and . . . profound
hopelessness and [a] desire to die may result,”117 this syndrome, if not
treated satisfactorily with pharmacological therapy, should render such a
demoralized patient incompetent to make medical decisions.118
Yet, interestingly, there is no conclusive empirical evidence to sup-
port an all too popular conclusion that depression so impairs judgment as
to prevent one from competently disapproving of the initiation or cessa-
tion of medical treatment.119  Sadly, this depression argument would ap-
pear to be a ruse to obstruct and even prevent end-of-life decision-
making on the grounds of moral repugnancy to alternative or surrogate
health care providers.120
If—and when—the demoralization syndrome is accepted by diag-
nosticians as a cognitive disorder, it would then remain for physicians to
respond with compassion and caring in remediating this medical condi-
tion.  If deemed proper, under the overarching principle of medical futil-
ity, physicians should consider the reasonableness of alleviating this
pathological mental state in the end-stage patient by administering termi-
nal sedation.  Such a course of treatment would be consistent with the
central obligation of all physicians to alleviate pain and suffering—here,
mental suffering—and to assure the dying patient’s dignity and best
interests.121
115 Rousseau, supra note 112; P.C. Rousseau, Dying and Terminal Sedation, 7 CLIN. GER- R
IATRICS 19, 19 (1999).
116 David W. Kissane, The Contribution of Demoralization to End of Life Decisionmak-
ing, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 24 (2004).
117 Id. at 23.  While anxiety and depression are viewed as “expressions of morality”—
thereby making them “synonymous with suffering (and) existential distress,” demoralization
may occur “independently of depression.” Id. at 23, 24.
118 Id. at 29.
119 RONALD A. LINDSAY, FUTURE BIOETHICS: OVERCOMING TABOOS, MYTHS AND DOG-
MAS 111 (2008).
120 Id. at 112.
121 See THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 58, at 192, 194 (quoting Dr. Edmund D. Pelle- R
grino).  All too often those suffering with dementia in the end-stage of life receive an array of
aggressive therapies from forced tube feeding to hospitalization for pneumonia—all of which
are not only of limited benefit but inconsistent with sound standards of palliative management.
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II. BROADENING THE BOUNDARIES OF HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE CARE
Over the next twenty years, the projected population of Americans
at least sixty-five years-old will more than double from thirty-four mil-
lion in 1997 to over sixty-nine million in 2030.122  For baby boomers,
one in nine may expect to reach the age of ninety; and by the year 2040,
the amount of Americans over the age of eighty-five will be nearly four
times that of those in 2003.123  The potential use of both hospice and
palliative care for these Americans staggers the imagination.124
Very often, palliative care practice seeks to manage incurable illness
in “the least unpleasant course,” allowing a patient to die from their in-
curable illness in the least traumatic manner.125  For a competent patient
to exercise their autonomy and be sufficiently informed to determine the
course of his medical treatment or non-treatment, they must have an ad-
mittedly “gruesome discussion about ways of dying.”126  This then al-
lows the patient to decide, essentially, which of several terminal events
will end his life.127  Understandably, some patients will not be willing, or
psychologically capable, of entering into such a discussion.128  In those
situations, the health care decisionmakers must attempt to discern the
patient’s wishes by evaluating his “total good or best interests.”129  The
challenge here is that if the patient is not informed, he cannot formulate
or evaluate ideas which promote his best interests as death approaches.130
When forced to determine whether to offer life-prolonging and life-
sustaining treatments to terminally ill autonomous patients, health care
decisionmakers should evaluate whether treatment measures are physio-
logically futile and whether the intrinsic burdens and risks of such mea-
sures are overwhelmingly greater than their benefits131—in other words,
whether the treatment is worse than the end-stage disease itself.
Susan L. Mitchell et al., The Clinical Course of Advanced Dementia, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1529, 1535 (Oct. 15, 2009).
122 JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 78, at S3. R
123 Id.
124 Id.  Current statistics show five million Americans are afflicted with dementia and
more than thirteen million are projected to be diagnosed by 2050.  Mitchell et al., supra note
121, at 1536; see generally JONATHAN HERRING, MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS 506–07 (2d ed. R
2008) (calling for an expansion of palliative care options); Susan L. Mitchell et al., Hospice
Care for Patients with Dementia, 34 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 7 (2007) (evaluating the
quality of care in hospices for patients with dementia).
125 FIONA RANDALL & ROBIN S. DOWNIE, PALLIATIVE CARE ETHICS: A GOOD COMPANION
117 (1996).
126 Id. at 118.
127 Id. at 117.
128 Id. at 118.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 119.
131 Id.
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Normally, actual hospice care precludes curative treatment in end-
of-life terminal illnesses.132  More contemporary thinking and policy,
while acknowledging the primary goal of hospice care to provide com-
fort, symptom management and alleviate pain, should not preclude actual
treatment.133  Traditionally, interdisciplinary palliative care teams of
nurses, social workers, residents, and geriatricians devote a major part of
their work to maintaining a standard of qualitative living for patients
with terminal illness.  Often, a continuum of adjusted care is created,
from the initial diagnosis through the end-stage of illness.134
The last ten years have produced a distinct change in the actual
scope of hospice care, which is expanding to embrace patients who are
terminally ill and suffering from diseases other than cancer (e.g., demen-
tia, chronic lung disease, and congestive heart failure) and provide pallia-
tive supplements for those patients who are terminally ill and confined to
nursing homes.135  In fact, approximately one-third of hospitals in the
United States are now offering some form of inpatient palliative care
which is not limited to life expectancy of six months or less.136
Nevertheless, because of prevailing requirements to forego disease-
directed therapy before being allowed hospice care, most Americans die
without the benefit of palliative care.137  “Bridge programs” are being
experimented with, however, in some hospices, which actually allow pa-
tients to continue active treatment therapies that are deemed important to
the patient and have some limited potential for helping manage end-stage
illness.138  In the final analysis, the better-reasoned view is to consider
palliative care and hospice care “an integral part of all health care” and
not as “care of last resort.”139
132 Sandra L. Ragan, Elaine Wittenberg & Harry T. Hall, The Communication of Pallia-
tive Care for the Elderly Cancer Patient, 15 HEALTH COMM. 219 (2003).
133 Id.
134 Joanne Kenen, A New Focus on Easing the Pain: Palliative Care Helps the Very Ill.  It
May Also Keep Costs Down, WASH. POST, July 3, 2007, at F1.
135 Quill, Physician-Assisted Death, supra note 40, at 18. R
136 Kenen, supra note 134, at F1. R
137 Quill, Physician-Assisted Death, supra note 40, at 18.  While approximately seventy R
percent of Americans wish to die at home, about half die in hospitals; and although hospice or
palliative care is available to those suffering from terminal illness, practically, most get only a
few weeks of this care.  Thomas, supra note 35, at 40. R
138 Quill, Physician-Assisted Death, supra note 40. R
139 Jennings et al., supra note 122, at S9.  A recent report by the Lien Foundation on end R
of-life care in forty countries found Britain topping the list with Australia placing second and
the United States placing third.  Rankings were given based on three factors: life expectancy,
hospice availability, and access to painkillers.  Because of a policy by health insurers that
payment for palliative care will only be covered when a patient relinquishes curative treat-
ments upon entering hospice, the United States did not score well on this assessment factor.
See Grim Reapings: The Quality of Death, THE ECONOMIST, July 17, 2010, at 54.
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The degree of care and level of sustainable qualitative living at the
end-of-life depends on disease prognosis.  Some prognoses are poor,
others terminal.  While metastatic cancer is terminal, end-stage liver dis-
ease, severe emphysema, and congestive heart failure are often seen as
worse prognoses, as to time, than cancer.  A diagnosis of kidney disease
is often seen as an appropriate time to develop strategies for end-stage
care.140
It has been said that “the palliative care movement has come of
age,” especially with the recent action of the American Board of Medical
Specialties certifying this palliative care as a subspecialty.141  Even with
these remarkable advances in expanded care and board certification of
the field, there are gaps in providing adequate education and training in
basic palliative management and a shortage of skilled clinicians in this
board-certified field.142  It is hoped that this classification will serve as a
catalyst for advancing greater opportunities for expanded training and
service in palliative medicine.143
III. SHAPING THE PRINCIPLE OF MEDICAL FUTILITY
A. Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation
All too frequently, when sanctity of life is embraced as a religious
or moral construct, it becomes impervious to rational argument.144
When juxtaposed with quality of life, the religious view complicates and,
it is argued, often trumps secular arguments viewing the standard of
quality of life as the more rational construct for decision-making in end-
stage illness.145  Instead of one principle or concern dominating the
other, both approaches should be used in evaluating a patient’s medical
prognosis and placing “hope”146 for recovery within a proper, realistic
context consistent with patient values.
While quality of life varies from person to person and, thus, cannot
be bound by one uniform standard, it can be tested by a sense of compas-
sion or mercy.  If a terminal patient is experiencing great physical pain or
mental suffering, it makes sense that medically-approved actions must be
undertaken to alleviate that suffering.  Failure to act accordingly is surely
an affront to the very notion of human dignity.  Ambiguous and subtle
140 Kenen, supra note 134. R
141 Quill, Physician-Assisted Death, supra note 40, at 17. R
142 See id. at 18.
143 See id.
144 See RONALD A. LINDSAY, FUTURE BIOETHICS: OVERCOMING TABOOS, MYTHS, AND
DOGMAS 52–53 (2008).
145 Id.; see ROBERT YOUNG, MEDICALLY ASSISTED DEATH, 29–43 (2007).
146 Adrienne M. Martin, Hope and Exploitation, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 49 (2008).
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philosophical refinements serve no practical purpose and defy not only
the medical principle of futility, but compassion and mercy.147
Rather than analyze and “test” supposed levels of the patient’s in-
tent in the management of end-stage illness, it is reasonable to isolate the
standard of proportionality from the “traditional” test of double effect
and simply weigh the costs and benefits of following a course of ac-
tion.148  Accordingly, if a decision to discontinue care is in proportion to
the “quality” of life remaining for a terminal patient, that decision should
be recognized as not only rational, but efficacious and humane.
Anchored at the fulcrum of the cost-benefit test of proportionality is the
principle of medical futility, which is supported and complemented by
the principle of compassion and the cardinal principle of beneficence.  If
the present system were redesigned as this Article urges, a new approach
to managing ethical issues in end-of-life care will avoid the taxonomical
ambiguity seen in the classical principle of double effect.
B. Clinical Applications
In 1974, Richard A. McCormick, S.J., suggested a basic medical
approach to determine when life is no longer meaningful, consistent with
the American Medical Association’s 1974 policy on the issue.149 For Fr.
McCormick, when there is irrefutable evidence that biological death is
imminent, no extraordinary measures should be undertaken to sustain
life.150  Fr. McCormick believed that evidence was met when an individ-
ual patient’s condition “negat[es] any truly human—i.e., relational—po-
tential relationships.”151
Recognizing that this standard of relational capacity is not subject to
mathematical precision, Fr. McCormick urged the medical profession to
agree on concrete categories or presumptive symptoms to aid in reaching
this judgment.152  When maintenance of life means the prolongation of
pain, with little or no chance of a real or sustainable level of qualitative
recovery or rehabilitation, there is really no opportunity to grasp or seek
147 Edmund D. Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life: The Use and Abuse of The Con-
cept of Family, in THE DIGNITY OF THE DYING PERSON 231 (Juan De Dios Vial Correa & Elio
Segreccia eds., 2000) (1999) [hereinafter Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life].
148 Id. (observing that a disproportionate treatment is synonymous with futility); see Pel-
legrino, Decision at The End of Life, supra note 147. R
149 Richard A. McCormick, To Save or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine 229 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N. 172 (1974).
150 Id.
151 Id.  Dr. Joseph Fletcher suggested a number of factors could be used to test whether
one’s medical state is consistent with common indicators of personhood.  The pivotal factor is
whether the at-risk patient has a functioning cortex.  Joseph Fletcher, A Tentative Profile of
Man, 2 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 1 (Nov. 1972).
152 McCormick, supra note 149. R
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the overall meaning of life or “relational-potential.”  At this point, any
treatment should be recognized as futile and cease accordingly.153
Today, Fr. McCormick’s analytical approach is absorbed within the
principle of medical futility.  Although Fr. McCormick abjured quality of
life indices in determining when life should be maintained or allowed to
end, it is argued here that the indicia, when shaped by standards of
mercy, compassion, love or humanism, should be seen as an integral part
of medical futility.154  Accordingly, the principle of medical futility
comes into play in those clinical cases where: a cure is physiologically
impossible; the treatment is non-beneficial or unlikely to be beneficial;
and in those cases where treatment, while plausible, has yet to be
validated.155
An alternative approach to defining futility concludes that no obli-
gation exists to either offer treatment or maintain existing treatment.
Thus, when an intervention—even a life-sustaining one—which is veri-
fied by contemporary clinical experience and medical knowledge, holds
no reasonable promise for effecting recovery, imposes burdensome con-
sequences “grossly disproportionate” to any expected benefit, has no ef-
ficacious value in mitigating patient discomfort, or serves only to
artificially delay death “by sustaining, supplanting or restoring a vital
function,” then no obligation exists to either offer for it, or, for that mat-
ter, maintain it.156
Admitting the existence of futile treatment negates the primary obli-
gation of health care professionals to “do no harm.”157  When a physician
prescribes a modality of treatment knowing that it is futile, he is expos-
ing the patient to needless additional risks associated with the treatment,
including infection or other adverse reactions.  Even if futile treatment
does not affect the patient adversely, the mere exposure to risk is cruel.
Moreover, some interventions—such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR)—inflict severe physical trauma.158  Administering CPR when
there is no medically reasonable chance that a distressed patient will re-
153 Id.
154 Smith, Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility, supra note 50. R
155 Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Nancy Jecker, Futility in Practice, 153 ARCH. INTERN.
MED. 437, 440 (1993).
156 Lance K. Stell, Stopping Treatment on the Grounds of Futility: A Role for Institutional
Policy, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 481, 495 (1992).  Any request that medical therapy be
offered to patients who would have less than a one percent chance of success should be
deemed unreasonable and, thus, futile.  Lawrence F. Schneiderman, Nancy S. Jecker & Albert
R. Jonsen, Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, in BIOETHICS: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE 408, 412 (Nancy S. Jecker, Albert R.
Jonsen & Robert A. Pearlman eds. 2d ed. 2007).
157 John L. Paris et al., Physician’s Refusal of Requested Treatment: The Case of Baby L,
322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 112, 1014 (1990).
158 Smith, Euphemistic Codes, supra note 37. R
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cover from the underlying illness amounts to physical torture.159  Ac-
cordingly, physicians should be under a duty to cease performing futile
treatments because, by doing so, they are inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment on their patients and their respective families.160
Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino, former Chairman of the President’s
Council on Bioethics, suggests that the primary goal in dealing with
cases of futility is achieving for the patient a level of “total good.”  This
goal is realized when a carefully calibrated balance is struck between
three criteria: the effectiveness, benefits, and burdens of treatment
reached within a cooperative “alliance” between the treating physician
and the patient or his surrogate decisionmaker.161  For Dr. Pellegrino,
futility is not an isolated, empirical yes or no test.  Rather, each judgment
of futility takes all aspects of patient’s total life experience into ac-
count—physical, mental, and spiritual preferences together with their life
goals.  As such, each judgment “demands prudential assessment for a
particular person in a particular experience of illness and within a partic-
ular metaphysical and theological context.”162
Closely, if not inextricably related to the doctrine of medical futility,
is the principle of proportionality.  Under this principle, there is no obli-
gation to provide a specific treatment when overuse or underuse would
create an unreasonable burden inflicting a disproportionate amount of
harm or suffering to any realistic benefit derived from the treatment.163
Often presented as a cost-benefit theory, the factors used in the balancing
test under this principle are not uniformly quantified.164  In an effort to
bring structure to this contentious issue, Dr. Pellegrino suggests “dispro-
portionate” use is—simply— futile medical care.165
159 Id.
160 Smith, Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility, supra note 48. R
161 Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life, supra note 147, at 227. R
162 Id. at 240.
163 Margaret A. Somerville, The Song of Death: The Lyrics of Euthanasia, 9 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 62 (1993).
164 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
228–34 (3d ed. 1989).
165 Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life, supra note 147, at 229.  For medical treat- R
ments seen as “extraordinary” and excessively burdensome, the Roman Catholic Church in
1957, through Pope Pius XII, concluded such can licitly be withdrawn. Id. at 219.  And, in
1980, the Declaration on Euthanasia was issued by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith which sought to amplify the policy for testing when medical treatment is dispro-
portionate to the benefit conferred by it. Id. at 229.  Accordingly, the Congregation suggests
the type of treatment and its complexity be compared (or balanced) against the result to be
expected from its use while considering the state of the ill person, his physician and their
moral resources. Id.
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C. Model Legislative Guidance
All too often, the clinical application of these substantive medical
norms to aid in decision-making remains beyond the understanding of
patients, their health proxies, and patients’ families.166  Today, hospital
policies regarding the determination of medical futility are usually
grounded in a “consultative consensus-building approach.”167  Yet, inter-
estingly, nine states have adopted the Uniform Health Care Decisions
Act168 and gone on record as stating that there must be a point of closure
or finality in end-of-life care-giving where consultation must yield even-
tually to decisive action.169  Under this Act, there is no “absolute” obli-
gation on the provider’s part to honor a health care surrogate’s demand
for the initiation or continuation of care.170  Medical care may be refused
if the attending physician determines that care would be “ineffective”171
and contrary to generally accepted “health care standards,”172 or in viola-
tion of “conscience.”173  This model legislation is a bold step forward in
bringing much-needed clarity and finality to an area of decision-making
that is inherently clouded with emotional stress.
D. Sedation-Hastened Death
When aggressive medications used to control severe intractable
symptoms such as dyspnea, pain, myoclonus, vomiting, delirium, anxi-
ety, or agitation are unsuccessful and the symptoms remain severe, seda-
tion for a dying patient’s intractable distress is proper.174  There is
widespread disagreement, however, on the propriety of using sedatives
when the patient is suffering from psychological or emotional distress
166 One study discovered that conflicts arose in seventy-eight percent of cases where is-
sues of limiting life-sustaining medical treatment were in play and normally involved a de-
mand of health care providers to provide care when a decision was made that such action was
either inappropriate or futile.  Thaddeus M. Pope & Ellen A. Waldman, Mediation at the End
of Life: Getting Beyond the Limits of the Talking Cure, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 4 n.
13 (2007).
167 Sandra H. Johnson et al., Legal and Institutional Policy Responses to Medical Futility,
30 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 21, 31 (1997).
168 Unif. Health Care Decisions Act §§ 1–19, 9 U.L.A. 93 (1993).
169 See Johnson, supra note 168, at 34 (suggesting that if conflicts regarding medical R
futility remain unresolved after using a consultative, consensus-building approach, medical
futility policies must designate a decision-maker and institute a process for decisively resolv-
ing the conflict); Unif. Health Care Decisions Act at §§ 1–19 (providing for the creation of
advance health-care directives to authorize an agent or surrogate to make health care decisions
for an individual).
170 See Unif. Health Care Decisions Act, supra note 168, at Prefatory Note ¶ 7. R
171 Id. § 13(d).
172 Id. §§ 7(f), 13(d).
173 Id. § 7(e).
174 Eric L. Krakauer et al., Sedation for Intractable Distress of a Dying Patient: Acute
Palliative Care and The Principle of Double Effect, 5 THE ONCOLOGIST 53 (2000).
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instead of physical pain.175  This Article postulates that, instead of sepa-
rating the somatic from the non-somatic in assessing and evaluating a
course of proper medical treatment for end-stage illness, charity should
be the “final principle and ultimate virtue of care for the dying.”176  The
extent or degree of charity or compassion shown—from a standard of
health care delivery and law—should, in turn, be framed by the doctrine
of medical futility177 or adjusted care.178  To continue treatment which is
medically futile would be morally wrong, for it “would deny the fact of
human finitude and impose unnecessary effort, expense, and emotional
trauma on the patient and on others.”179  Indeed, to continue treatment of
futile medical conditions can be understood as violating beneficence—
the primary principle of traditional medical ethics.180
Autonomous patients may request sedation in order to abate severe
distress manifested by unrelieved pain, restlessness, or mental
anguish.181  Here, the intent of the physician administering the sedation
is to alleviate the distress by either “decreasing mental anguish or lessen-
ing the patient’s awareness of it.”182  Often, sedation is intermittent and
has been termed “respite”183 or “twilight sleep”184 leading to the concern
by some that it is but a euphemism for euthanasia, especially when the
procedure is used for non-autonomous patients.185  Others argue that the
degree or extent of sedation is tied to the level of patient distress—with
the sole purpose of alleviating the distress.186
While there is a significant risk that life may well be shortened by
the use of sedatives in both the case of the terminally ill autonomous
patient and the non-autonomous patient suffering medical distress, the
generally accepted policy is that when all other “traditional” efforts at
pain management are ineffective, “the great benefits of alleviating such
suffering by sedation . . . outweigh the harm entailed in the risk of short-
175 Id.; see also RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 125, at 154–55. R
176 Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life, supra note 147, at 241. R
177 Smith, Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility, supra note 50. R
178 See Smith, Terminal Sedation, supra note 36, at 383. R
179 Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life, supra note 147, at 235. R
180 Id. at 223.  When a patient is in end-stage illness, yet not in peril of immediate death,
efforts to sedate “toward death” are seen, by some as unethical. See, e.g., Daniel P. Sulmasy,
The Use and Abuse of The Principle of Double Effect, 3 CLIN. PULMONARY MED. 86 (1996).
181 RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 125, at 72. R
182 Quill & Byock, supra note 52, at 409. R
183 Williams, supra note 30, at 49. R
184 Id.
185 Id.; see also RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 125, at 72.  Another less troubling eu- R
phemism for terminal sedation is sedation-hastened death.
186 Id.
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ening life.”187  The logic of this policy is found directly in a straightfor-
ward application of cost-benefit analysis.188
E. A Protocol for Palliative Sedation of Existential Pain
In order for palliative, or “terminal” sedation to be administered, an
eight-step process needs to be followed.  Patients presenting symptoms
should: (1) be diagnosed as being terminally ill189 or moribund,190
(2) have a current “Do Not Resuscitate” order listed in their medical
records, (3) have exhausted all palliative treatments for anxiety, delirium,
or depression,191 (4) receive a psychological evaluation by a qualified
clinician together with a similar spiritual assessment by a member of the
clergy of any issues which may be particular to the needs of a patient,192
(5) participate in a candid discussion with their physician and family re-
garding the costs versus the benefits of a course of palliative sedation,
(6) subsequent to this discussion, have signed an informed consent to the
therapy, on the part of the patient or his surrogate decisionmaker, and
(7) give consideration to whether a trial of respite sedation should first be
undertaken before the deep sedation.193  With respite sedation, a sedative
is ordered for a predetermined time frame—for example twenty-four to
forty-eight hours—with a downward titration of the sedative occurring
until the patient is restored to consciousness.194  The eighth and final step
in this model protocol requires an unequivocal dosage policy to be estab-
lished and forbids increasing the level of sedative unless the patient
awakens or otherwise presents evidence of suffering (e.g., restlessness,
grimaces or withdraws from stimuli)195 or discomfort (e.g., displays a
furrowed brow or develops hypertension).196
The significant value to this suggested eight-step protocol is that it
provides both a chance for the patient’s family and health care team to
reassess his condition, and may even ease or cease the distress which
initiated the request for continuous sedation entirely.  When trials of res-
pite sedation are inconclusive or fail, all parties to the plan for full pallia-
tive sedation should be advised that death may not occur for days or even
weeks.197
187 Id.
188 Id.; see also Williams, supra note 30, at 41. R
189 Rousseau, supra note 112, at 152. R
190 Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 1812. R
191 Rousseau, supra note 112, at 152. R
192 Id. at 153.
193 Id.
194 Id.; see Quill & Byock, supra note 52, at 413 tbl.2 (2000). R
195 Rousseau, supra note 112, at 153. R
196 Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 1813. R
197 Rousseau, supra note 112, at 153. R
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Establishing a classification scale in advance of the actual sedation
could also go far toward alleviating inconsistencies in treatment.  Thus,
for cancer patients, “primary continuous deep sedation for delirium”
could be ordered, and for patients with dyspnea caused by lung cancer,
“secondary continuous mild sedation” could be ordered.198  When lower
doses are unable to provide symptomatic relief, then—and only then—
should dosages be increased.199  To neglect establishing a policy of this
type could well give rise to an impression or allegation that the attending
physician was hastening death and had embraced euthanasia or physi-
cian-assisted suicide by exceeding the bounds of medically efficacious
therapy through palliative sedation.200
F. Public Misconceptions
In popular culture, the use of barbiturates as a legitimate component
of palliative care has developed a negative connotation because its ad-
ministration has been closely associated with, not only euthanasia as
practiced in the Netherlands, but also a method to perform capital pun-
ishment and as a means to effect physician-assisted suicide.201  Their use
can, however, be justified easily under the principle of double effect be-
cause barbiturates provide effective comfort for those at the end stages of
life.202  A simple standard of compassion and adjusted care can serve as
a guide for pharmacological uses of barbiturates.
G. A Noble Effort Toward Clarification?
A 2008 report by the American Medical Association’s Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs and dealing with the subject of sedation to
unconsciousness in end-of-life care,203 reaches a number of pertinent
conclusions: (1) “The use of sedation in palliative care is not ethically
198 Morita et al., supra note 114, at 452. R
199 Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 1812. R
200 Rousseau, supra note 112, at 153.  An alternative five step protocol for the administra- R
tion of terminal sedation as palliative care requires five conditions be met before its adminis-
tration: severe suffering (even though standard palliative care has been provided); no
therapeutic options are seen as effective within disease prognosis; survival is severely limited;
an explicit desire for sedation has been made by the at-risk patient, and—finally—respite is
effected by intermittent or mild sedation and not continuous.  Morita et al., supra note 101; see R
Quill & Byock, supra note 52, at 411 tbl.1; see also Berger, supra note 37, at 36 (providing R
listing of guidelines for acceptable usage of PSU); Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, The Supreme
Court Addresses Physician-Assisted Suicide: Can Its Rulings Improve Palliative Care?, 8
ARCH. FAM. MED. 200, 203 (1999).
201 Krakauer et al., supra note 174, at 57. R
202 Id. at 56–57.
203 MARK A. LEVINE, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS’N REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL
AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS (CEJA), SEDATION TO UNCONSCIOUSNESS IN END-OF-LIFE CARE, CEJA
REPORT 5-A-08, at 6 (2008) [hereinafter CEJA REPORT].
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controversial”;204 (2) sedating to unconsciousness is a valid option of
medical treatment for those who are “terminally ill” and have “clinical
symptoms” which are “unresponsive to aggressive, symptom-specific
treatments”;205 (3) before sedating to unconsciousness, informed consent
must be obtained from the patient or the patient’s designated health care
surrogate;206 (4) consultation with “a multi disciplinary team”—includ-
ing a palliative care specialist—should be undertaken in order to deter-
mine whether this form of sedation is presently viewed as
“appropriate”;207 (5) physicians should discuss the plan for sedation with
their patients, including the expected results and length of treatment;208
(6) implementation should include monitoring the appropriateness of
care during the sedation;209 (7) issues of existential pain should not be
addressed through the use of palliative sedation, but rather “by providing
the patient with needed social support”;210 and (8) the intentional use of
palliative sedation to “cause a patient’s death” should be prohibited.211
Although this Report makes a noble effort to clarify and even “re-
solve” inherent difficulties and imprecision surrounding the administra-
tion of palliative sedation, there remains a fatal flaw—its continued
reliance on “intention” as the paramount guide for determining when opi-
ate and sedative use is seen as palliative and not a means of either eutha-
nasia or physician-assisted suicide.212  The Report embraces the doctrine
of double effect as the tool to test whether proper intent is shown in
pharmacologic therapies.213  Although recognizing proportionality as a
“central tenet of the principle of double effect,”214 the Report tries—
unsuccessfully and “naively”215—to gauge intent and measure propor-
tionality by dosage uses.216  Accordingly, when there are continuous in-
fusions or repeated dosages, these actions may be seen as “indicators of
proportionate palliative sedation.”217  Contrariwise, “one large dose or
rapidly accelerating doses . . . may signify lack of knowledge or an inap-
propriate intention to hasten death.”218  The Report neglects an alterna-
204 Id. at 6.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 6–7.




212 Id. at 4.
213 Id. at 5.
214 CEJA REPORT, at 5.
215 Battin, supra note 37, at 29. R
216 CEJA REPORT, supra note 203, at 5. R
217 Id.
218 Id.
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tive explanation for repeated doses and infusions: that such dosage
patterns are little more than a “clever attempt to cover one’s tracks.”219
This Article argues that instead of shackling humane patient care in
end-of-life cases to the ambiguous doctrine of double effect, a more effi-
cacious test for medical propriety would be whether the benefits of phar-
macologic therapies, based on sound medical judgment, outweigh the
costs of not applying the therapies.220  A rational, common-sense deci-
sion-making process, bereft of uncertainties and focused on what actions
are beneficent and in the best interests of the terminal patient, should be
determinative.221
IV. DOUBLE EFFECT—TRADITIONAL AND
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
The principle of double effect—sometimes also stated as a doctrine
or rule—is grounded in Roman Catholic philosophy and moral theol-
ogy.222  It proposes to structure specific guidelines to aid in determining
when it is ethically permissible to pursue a course of action to achieve a
good end—notwithstanding the full understanding the negative or bad
results that will flow from the initiating conduct.223  Over time, philoso-
phers and ethicists have embraced this principle as having a profound
relevance in assessing complex cases of health care ethics either in their
classical application or by implication.224  Indeed, it is contended that the
principle has “improved care of the dying, and forms a common ground
for competing notions of good care for the dying.”225
Four conditions must be met for the conduct of the actor to be ac-
knowledged as ethically permissible: the nature of the action must be
good or morally neutral and, thus, not prohibited; a good effect or conse-
quence must be intended to flow from the action, and not a bad or evil
consequence; the good or positive result must not be used as a direct
casual consequence of the evil result; and the good or positive result
must be proportionate to any evil result.226  When all four conditions are
met, the personal conduct of the agent being evaluated is held to be ethi-
219 Battin, supra note 37, at 29. R
220 See infra Part IV notes and accompanying text.
221 Id.
222 Timothy E. Quill et al., The Rule of Double Effect—A Critique of Its Role in End-of-
Life Decision Making, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1768, 1768 (1997).
223 Id.
224 RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 125, at 73. R
225 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 10–11 (6th ed.
2008).
226 Quill et al., supra note 222. R
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cally permissible—this, even though an undesirable or “bad” result
occurs.227
A. Moral Distinctions or Subtleties
In palliative care management, a moral distinction has all too often
been recognized by some between the act of withdrawing treatment and
withholding treatment.228  Accordingly, it has been asserted that actions
incur a greater degree of legal accountability or responsibility than omis-
sions.229  The decision to make an act or an omission, however, does not
mean that its efficacy is grounded on a moral justification.230  Rather,
any such justification for treatment should be based primarily “on
whether the care given or not given is appropriate to the patient’s wishes
[and] physical condition” together with “certainty of [medical] pro-
gress.”231  The fact remains, however, that in palliative management, so-
ciety imposes moral and legal responsibility on caregivers for both
actions as well as omissions.232
This conundrum proves challenging for physicians to overcome.  In
cases of artificial hydration233—greater blame may be given to the act of
withdrawing treatment than withholding it.234  Physicians may become
reluctant—if not unwilling—to commence such medically appropriate
treatment in order to avoid having to stop it whenever it becomes inap-
227 Id.  Standing alone, without being tethered to the second condition, the undergirding
policy supporting the principle of double effect is to be seen as validating ethically the use of
medication in controlling pain—even when death may result. THOMASMA, HUMAN LIFE IN THE
BALANCE, supra note 81, at 176.  The doctrine of double effect is ordinarily presumed to apply R
only to doctors because it is presumed that only doctors administer the medication to their
patients.  Since, at the end-stage of life, more and more medical care and decision-making is
delegated to palliative care specialists and allied health professionals, it is arguable that these
individuals should be able to assert a defense of necessity.  Accordingly, they could assert that
the administration of lethal pain medications had been delegated legally to them and that their
use was compatible with maintaining the best interests of dying patients to be free of unremit-
ting and existential pain. IAN KERRIDGE ET AL., ETHICS AND LAW FOR THE HEALTH PROFES-
SIONS 653 (3d ed. 2009).
228 RANDALL & DOWNIE supra note 125, at 74; see also GEORGE P. SMITH, II, LEGAL AND R
HEALTH CARE ETHICS FOR THE ELDERLY 111–19 (1996).
229 RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 125, at 74. R
230 Id.
231 Id.; see generally James L. Bernat, Chronic Disorders of Consciousness, 367 THE
LANCET 1181 (April 8, 2006) (arguing that physicians should “reliably establish[ ]” how a
patient in a persistent vegetative state wished to be treated and then either treat aggressively or
withhold treatment based on those wishes); Laine & Davidoff, Patient-Centered Medicine: A
Professional Evolution, 275 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 152 (1996) (arguing that American medicine
is shifting towards patient-centered care).
232 RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 125, at 74. R
233 Id.
234 Id.; see CALLAHAN, infra note 327 (concluding that actions which withdraw nutrition R
and hydration are morally legitimate).
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propriate.  The effect of this action may well result in undertreating at-
risk patients.235
Another defensive response by physicians to the effort to chart a
moral distinction between the withholding and the withdrawal of treat-
ment—which makes this putative moral distinction, itself, neither logical
nor helpful—is seen in physician conduct which manifests itself in an
unwillingness “to stop life-prolonging treatment when it is no longer ap-
propriate because this constitutes a withdrawal of treatment which is seen
as potentially blameworthy[,] particularly as it may contribute to the pa-
tient’s death.”236  This may result in overtreatment of at-risk patients.237
B. Competing Clinical Intentions
Inasmuch as the doctrine of double effect analyzes two conse-
quences flowing from an action and seeks to place a “substantive moral
judgment” on one action (and its consequences) over another,238 the doc-
trine presents itself as a muddled template lacking any objective certainty
for decision-making.239  Utilizing this doctrine in both British and Amer-
ican courts requires a particularly astute pool of jurors who can ascertain
whether a physician’s intent was to either relieve suffering or cause death
in the administration of pain relief.  For the doctrine to be effective in
aiding judicial decision-making, a physician must admit that he adminis-
tered lethal treatment with the primary intent of causing death.  The
criminal consequences of such a forthright admission, make its occur-
rence unlikely.240  Indeed, it would be common for a physician to have
multiple intentions, or considerations in managing the treatment of in-
tractable pain that would likely result in death to the patient.241  The
competing intentions and the complexity of distinguishing between them
thus prove exceedingly problematic for the “positive consequence” re-
quirement of double effect. While legal terms such as “intention” and
“foresight” may appear to be neutral in a moral sense, they actually “re-
late to inherently moral issues” and invite ill-advised subjective moral
judgments.242
235 RANDALL & DOWNIE supra note 125, at 74. R
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Suzanne Ost, Euthanasia and The Defense of Necessity: Advocating a More Appropri-
ate Legal Response, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND HEALTH CARE LAW 103 (Charles
A. Erin & Suzanne Ost eds. 2007) [hereinafter Ost, Euthanasia and The Defense of Necessity].
239 Id. at 103, 104.
240 Id. at 105.
241 Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 1813. R
242 Ost, Euthanasia and The Defense of Necessity, supra note 238, at 103; see Lo & R
Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 1810 (questioning whether dosage size is determinative of in- R
tent); Timothy E. Quill, The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1039
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The medical community asserts that the use of sedatives is not in-
tended to hasten death.243  Even though it is foreseeable that death will
occur sooner rather than later with the use of terminal sedation, the fact
that physicians maintain that the practice is medically justifiable should
be taken as conclusive.244  Were this proposition accepted, then no need
would exist to question the applicability of the principle of double effect.
Yet, this “assurance” or “conclusion” is not accepted at face value as an
honest professional judgment.245  While many in the medical field sup-
port the notion that sedatives do not hasten death, other caregivers see it
as but a “fig leaf” for euthanasia.”246  These dissenters, along with some
patients and their families, are blinded by the myth (often spread by the
media) that analgesics such as barbiturates are “nothing more than a po-
lite way to kill the patient.”247
C. Justifying Double Effect for Palliative Sedation
The central element for justifying palliative sedation under the prin-
ciple of double effect is found in the moral distinction drawn between the
intentions of the actor-physician and the unintended yet foreseeable con-
sequences of their primary action.  Taking the life of another is always
morally impermissible, yet when this results from actions carrying fore-
seeable but unintended harm, it may be permissible when the action pro-
duces proportionate good.248  Put in context, even when a foreseen risk
of hastened death is accepted, a physician may nonetheless order high
doses of opioids and sedative in order to relieve a patient’s suffering.249
For ethicists, however, there is no clear line between efforts to relieve
refractory systems and hastening death.250  The manner by which a phy-
sician declares his intention, is more determinative than what actions he
takes under this doctrine.  Ambiguity arises when physicians have admit-
ted to dual intentions when administering large doses of opioids: inten-
tions to both decrease suffering and hasten death, as seen in various
studies.251
Physician intent is irrelevant, however, when the validity of with-
drawing nutrition and hydration is raised.  There, the operative issue is
(1993) (suggesting proportionality of treatments is crucial to discerning clinical intent); Wil-
liams, supra note 30, at 46. R





248 See Quill et al., supra note 38, at 2101; see also SHAI J. LAVI, THE MODERN ART OF R
DYING 129–34 (2005); SMITH, supra note 89, at 101–09 R
249 Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 1812. R
250 Id. at 1813; see Meisel, infra note 328. R
251 Id.; see LAVI, supra note 248, at 129–34. R
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whether it is within the individual patient’s “liberty interest” in making
this decision.252
Regardless of whether clinical reality supports the con-
cept of total patient autonomy on this issue, the legal
precedent places this decision ultimately with the pa-
tient . . . . Legally, a physician’s intent is irrelevant with
respect to a patient’s refusal or request for the with-
drawal of a life-sustaining medical intervention.  A phy-
sician’s intent becomes a legal factor only when the
physician takes an active, interventionist measure that
could cause a patient’s death.253
It is well-established that legal liability is imposed upon those who
cause injury to another and foresaw or should have foreseen the conse-
quences of their actions.254  This legal standard is considerably broader
than the principle of double effect, which limits liability for unintentional
consequences.  As such, the principle of double effect may well be at
odds with the standards of modern jurisprudence.  Those who disagree
with this principle may also reject the idea that it is morally wrong to
cause or hasten the death of a moribund or terminally ill patient.255
Given these inherent weaknesses in the principle of double effect, it
would be more efficacious to reformulate the justification for palliative
sedation by examining proportionality rather than intention.  Under pro-
portionality, compassion and patient preferences are determinative.  Pro-
portionality allows for a balancing of the guidelines, thus avoiding the
oftentimes conflicting ethical obligations to both relieve patient suffering
and not act with the intention of causing death.  Thus, if a physician
believes it is more compassionate to relieve refractory symptoms than to
prolong a life filled with physical torment, the physician may, as guided
by patient preferences, administer palliative sedation within the bounds
of good medical practice.256  Sadly, there is a mistaken perception that
death is always hastened by the aggressive administration of pain
management.257
252 McStay, supra note 36, at 60. R
253 Id.
254 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 334 (2000); see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 169, 290, 303 (W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs,
Robert E. Keeton & David G. Owen eds., 5th ed. 1984).
255 Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 1813. R
256 Id.; see Joseph Boyle, Enriching Proportionalism Through Christian Narrative in
Bioethics: The Decisive Development in Richard McCormick’s Moral Theory?, 24 CHRISTIAN
BIOETHICS 302, 304, 306–08 (2008) [hereinafter Boyle, Enriching Proportionalism] (analyz-
ing proportionalism as a method “for justifying moral norms and judgments in the light of
basic goods”).
257 FURROW ET AL., supra note 225, at 10. R
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British courts have, over time, allowed physicians to take palliative
measures despite their incidental effect of shortening life.  Their justifi-
cation is expressed in a moral concept that acknowledges that physicians
may limit suffering even though they may not put an immediate end to a
patient’s life.  This focus on helping, rather than killing, may prove to be
an invaluable psychological construct for the physician as well as the
courts.  While a physician may be fully aware of the consequences of his
actions of increasing dosages of diamorphine for a patient, he need not
describe the act nor be socially compelled to view it as “an act of kill-
ing.”258  The nuanced complexities of double effect are essentially sub-
sumed under this concept.  This restatement is inextricably tied to the
principles of compassion and mercy, and emphasizes proportionality, and
the mandate to avoid suffering.  This reformulation would go far to pre-
sent a new contemporary construct for decision-making by avoiding the
quicksands of the “traditional” approach used by the principle of double
effect.
D. Dosage and Titration
Perhaps the most valid indicator of a physician’s intent is the act of
titrating analgesics to effect patient comfort without intending to hasten
patient death.  If analgesis (e.g., barbiturates, opioids) as titrated to effect
patient comfort, without intending to hasten patient death, this action—in
and of itself—is perhaps the most valid indicator of a physician’s intent
and of particular importance in “validating” actions under the doctrine of
double effect.259  One of the rather predictable side effects of using
opiates for pain relief is that sedation occurs.260  Non-sedating agents are,
of course, preferred but not always effective.261  In administering seda-
tion for refractory pain, a physician should initially seek symptom relief
by administering the lowest dosage262—one which neither suppresses
respiration nor leads to respiratory distress.263  Dosage that provides no
possibility for symptom relief without patient death could be termed
properly as active euthanasia.264  When lower dosages are ineffective,
increased dosages are permissible,265 but they should be justified by clear
258 Alexander McCall Smith, Euthanasia: The Strengths of The Middle Ground, 7 MED.
L. REV. 195, 206–07 (1999).
259 Eric L. Krakauer et al., Sedation for Intractable Distress of a Dying Patient: Acute




263 Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 113, at 1812. R
264 Id.; see LAVI, supra note 248. R
265 Id.  For the conscious patient, reports of continued pain, displays of agitation, restless-
ness and confusion and either respiratory distress or myoclonus, would be grounds for dosage
increases.  For the unconscious patient, unable to report levels of distress, it remains for health
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criteria or clinical indications such as documentation in the patient
records and charts.266
Direct medical actions of this nature most usually occur when sud-
den or severe patient distress urge acute palliative care.267  This distress
can manifest itself in the form of pain or other physical symptoms, as
well as psychological distress in the form of severe anxiety or agitated
delirium.268  As observed, the administration of the necessary analgesis
in order to give effective comfort and relief, such as opioids and
benzodiazepines, often are accompanied by significant side effects that
must be anticipated, managed, and explained to a patient and their
family.
E. Challenging Traditional Applications
Those who reject the rigid classical application of the principle of
double effect assert that it lacks both efficacy and utility in palliative
care.  If released from the principle’s raison d’etre—to provide an abso-
lute safeguard against the intentional shortening of life, and instead, rec-
ognizing that the benefits of relieving medical distress in cases of
terminal illness through use of respite or terminal sedation may outweigh
any associated harms, the principle becomes superfluous to palliative
management.269  Indeed, adopting such a contemporary and humane pol-
icy would eliminate altogether the complex and finely-nuanced argu-
ments which seek to distinguish between intending and foreseeing the
effects of one’s actions.270  Restructured as such, the principle of double
effect would become a common sense approach to medicolegal and ethi-
cal decision-making in “accordance with the moral intuitions of most
people.”271  Moreover, reformulating this template for decision-making
and elevating compassion and proportionality to controlling values
care providers to access levels of discomfort (e.g., furrowed brow, tachypnea and other symp-
tomatologies associated with suffering). Id. at 1811, 1813.
266 Id. at 1813.  Efforts of the American Medical Association Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs to “clarify” the medically proper uses for palliative sedation, and specifically
dosage distinctions have been termed “naive in the extreme.”  Battin, supra note 37, at 29. R
The Council’s effort to infer physician intent from the pattern of practice in dosage states, “one
large dose” or “rapidly accelerated doses of morphine may signify a bad intention (seeking to
cause death) while “repeated doses or continuous infusions are benign.”  CEJA REPORT, supra
note 203, at 5.  Prof. Battin argues convincingly that “repeated dosage and continuous infu- R
sions” could well be taken as “a clever attempt to cover one’s tracks.”  Battin, supra note 37, R
at 29.
267 Krakauer et al., supra note 259, at 60. R
268 Id.
269 RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 125, at 73. R
270 Id.
271 Id.; see Boyle, Enriching Proportionalism, supra note 256, at 307 (discussing how, R
under proportionalism, not only are moral absolute rejected, but also the traditional doctrine of
double effect).
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would constitute a bold reaffirmation of beneficence, charity, compas-
sion, and mercy as the policies behind such action.272
F. The Defense of Necessity
In 1958, Glanville Williams proposed that the law should recognize
a medical excuse in cases where pain is so severe that its alleviation can
only be achieved by administering a lethal dose of drugs.273  This excuse
would rest “upon the doctrine of necessity, there being at this juncture no
way of relieving pain without ending life.”274  Accordingly, a physician
could assert this defense to a charge of euthanasia or murder by showing
that, by evaluating all circumstances surrounding a patient’s condition
(and not focusing exclusively on a physician’s intent),275 he acted in a
good faith effort to alleviate the severe or unbearable suffering of a pa-
tient,276 with a reasonable belief that the actions were a proportionate
response to the patient’s medical condition.277  Factored into the validity
of this legal defense would be another highly relevant factor: the extent
and frequency of a competent patient’s request for assistance in dying.278
In a very real way, then, the defense of necessity is grounded in
compassion.
272 See Timothy E. Quill, The Ambiguity of Clinical Institutions 329 N. ENG. J. MED.
1039 (1993) (arguing that proportionality should be the central focus for evaluating decisions
of this nature).
273 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 286–88 (1958).
If there is “no way of relieving pain without ending life,” the defense of necessity should be
allowed. Id.  Yet, when other pain management therapies are available and effective, this
defense would not be available to physicians nor would it be allowed when evidence estab-
lished lethal drugs were administered which had “no analgesic or sedative effect.” KERRIDGE
ET AL., supra note 227, at 652.  The defense of necessity has been available as a valid defense R
to murder in the U.K. since 2000. Id. (citing Re A [2000] 4 All ER 961, 1051 (Brooke LJ); R
v Latimer [2001] 193 DLR (4th) 577, 596); see Boyle, Enriching Proportionalism, supra note
256, at 306 (detailing how—under proportionalism—goods are commensurated so that a per- R
son deliberating rationally, intuitively, or by differential feelings, in order to make a reasonable
judgment, seeks to promote a greater proportion of good over bad; or, alternatively, “when the
situation is bad, a lesser proportion of bad over good—the lesser evil”—is sought).
274 Id. at 288.
275 Ost, Euthanasia and The Defense of Necessity, supra note 238, at 115–16. R
276 Id.  “A common sense notion of medical duty” to respond in end-stage care is not only
established but validated, clinically, from either quantitative or qualitative evaluations of medi-
cal futility.  Schneiderman et al., supra note 156, at 409; see CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, R
supra note 64. R
277 Ost, Euthanasia and The Defense of Necessity, supra note 238, at 115–16; CROWN R
PROSECUTION SERVICE, supra note 64. R
278 Ost, Euthanasia and The Defense of Necessity, supra note 238, at 116.  The three R
elements of the defense of necessity could be established by utilizing the reasoning of the
doctrine of double effect.  Accordingly, when it could be established that a physicians actions
were undertaken in response to a patient’s intractable pain (and not to accelerate death) for
which there was no reasonable alternative course of treatment and that this action was in turn
“proportionate to the risk of a lengthy and painful dying process,” the defense should be al-
lowed. KERRIDGE ET AL., supra note 227, at 652. R
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G. Judicial Guideposts
Law and “legal arguments do not settle moral questions,” and it is a
truism “that all that is legal is not moral, and . . . all that is moral is not
necessarily legal.”279  Consequently, the extent to which arguments over
the legal definition and use of assisted suicide or euthanasia have any
moral weight depends on the extent to which they are “morally persua-
sive.”280  Ultimately, any legal debate in this area will prove faulty by
failing to address the moral complexities inherent in any discussion of
hastened death.281
When the U.S. Supreme Court had an opportunity to advance a
moral argument for accepting the rule of double effect in 1997, in Vacco
v. Quill282 and Washington v. Glucksberg,283 the Court proffered no
moral arguments for accepting such reasoning.284  It has been suggested,
however, that the Court did lay a foundation for recognizing a constitu-
tional right to adequate pain relief when dying.285  Within such a “right”
to receive care and avoid suffering in dying exists the coordinate right to
receive terminal sedation when deemed reasonable by either a competent
patient or a properly designated surrogate decisionmaker.  In cases of
incompetency, this right would be exercised by an attending health care
provider who determines this course of conduct is humane, compassion-
ate, and in the best interest of the patient.  This would be consistent with
279 Daniel P. Sulmasy & Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Rule of Double Effect: Clearing Up
The Double Talk, 159 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 545 (1999).
280 Id. at 548.
281 Id.  But see Edward Rabin, Assisted Suicide, Morality, and Law: Why Prohibiting
Assisted Suicide Violates The Establishment Clause, 63 VAND. L. REV. 763, 773–78, 791, 797,
810–11 (2010) (asserting that since existing laws prohibiting assisted suicide have derived—
historically—from a Christian morality of higher purpose and, thus, favor and indeed coerce a
particular religious morality, these laws are violative of the Establishment Clause of the Con-
stitution; instead, laws should reflect a standard of self-fulfillment which in turn would allow
pursuit of values for a satisfying life which do not harm others).
Another rather novel idea for limiting prosecutions for physician assisted death can be
found in the policy of desuetude—a notion, while not having explicit support by the U.S.
Supreme Court—is a procedural due process claim which allows an exemption from prosecu-
tion under laws which have been enacted many years ago, and may not be “relevant” therefore
with current public policies on the controlling issue, and are—further—also enforced sporadi-
cally.  Thus, the central argument would be those laws imposing liability for assisting others in
committing suicide were enacted during a time when physician assisted suicide was, because
of the emerging state of developing medical technologies and the then nascent awareness of
palliative treatment, not simply relevant and, accordingly, should be, as criminal statutes con-
strued narrowly.  Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1156–57 n.151. R
282 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
283 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
284 Sulmasy & Pellegrino, supra note 279, at 548. But see Marc Spindelman, Death, R
Dying and Domination, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1641 at 1661, n.60 (concluding that Glucksberg
constitutionalized the principle of double-effect).
285 Burt, supra note 47. R
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a physician’s commitment to embrace the “ethics of compassionate
response.”286
H. Withdrawal of Nutrition and Hydration
Artificial nutrition and hydration are properly viewed as medical
treatment, and may be legally withdrawn if a medical professional deems
their continuation as inconsistent with safeguarding the best interests of a
patient.287  The U.S. Supreme Court first assumed the existence of a right
to refuse nutrition and hydration in the 1990 case, Cruzan v. Dir., Mis-
souri Dept. of Health.288  The Court “inferred” this right of refusal from
a constitutionally-protected liberty interest grounded in the Due Process
Clause and the doctrine of informed consent.289  In the 1997 decision
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court used the Due Process Clause to
broaden this rule into a right to refuse medical treatment.290
In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court again sharpened a necessary dis-
tinction between the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment and physi-
cian-assisted suicide in Vacco v. Quill.291  Crucial to this distinction was
an understanding that while a patient will be killed if he actively ingests
a lethal dose of medication, an underlying disease pathology is the cause
of death for one who refuses life-sustaining treatment (e.g., nutrition and
hydration).292
In its effort to draw a clear distinction between the withdrawal of
life sustaining treatment considered by a patient to be “futile or degrad-
ing”293 and physician-assisted suicide where “the patient be made
dead,”294 the Court placed heavy emphasis upon the importance of intent
as determinative, tacitly approving terminal sedation.  The Court con-
cluded that when evaluating the propriety of “induc[ing] barbiturate
286 ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE NEW MEDICINE AND THE OLD ETHICS 49 (1990).  In cases of
incompetency, the physician has a special fiduciary-type “obligation to act as a steward of the
patient’s moral right to have his or her wishes fulfilled.”  While not a type of moral warrant for
a physician to impose a personal set of values or make the advancement of a medical good the
controlling principle, neither does this act of “beneficence-in-trust” mean that a physician sub-
mit “slavishly and uncritically to decisions made by a surrogate.”  Instead, “the obligation of
that stewardship is to clarify, validate and enhance the patient’s will to the extent possible.”
PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 81, at 162. R
287 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736–37 (O’Connor, J. concurring); see gener-
ally Lois L. Shepherd, Dignity and Autonomy After Washington v. Glucksberg, An Essay
About Abortion Death and Dignity, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431 (1998) (exploring the
notion that our current perception of dignity as linked to autonomy is flawed, and that the
concept of dignity needs to be expanded separately).
288 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
289 Id. at 270.
290 Id. at 720–23.
291 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 (1997).
292 Id. at 801.
293 Smith, Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility, supra note 50. R
294 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. at 801–02.
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coma and then star[ving] [a patient] to death,” medical professionals may
administer palliative care, including a decision to refuse the continuation
of life-sustaining treatment, which may “have the foreseen but unin-
tended ‘double effect’ of hastening the patient’s death.”295  Justice San-
dra Day O’Connor, writing a strong and eloquent concurring opinion in
both Glucksberg and Quill endorsing the use of terminal sedation in pal-
liative care,296 concluded that while the Constitution did not grant any
generalized right to “commit suicide,” there was a liberty interest in hav-
ing mentally competent persons control the manner of their deaths.297
The trio of Cruzan, Quill, and Glucksburg did not directly address
the legality of terminal sedation as a final strategy for dealing with re-
fractory pain.  The use of terminal sedation as an integral part of pallia-
tive care and management was, nonetheless, implicitly endorsed by the
Court.298
I. Clarifying Standards for Sedation, Alimentation, and Hydration
In 2006, the American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine
(AAHPM) issued a new position statement on artificial nutrition and hy-
dration (ANH) in end-of-life care, replacing its earlier statement on the
295 Id. at 807 n.11.
296 She was joined by Justice Ginsberg and, in part, by Justice Breyer.  Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736–37.
297 Id. at 736.
298 McStay, supra note 36, at 53.  On August 1, 2007, The Congregation for The Doctrine R
of Faith published, with approval, Responses to Certain Questions of The U.S. Conference of
Catholic Bishops which acknowledges in principle, that nutrition and hydration are both “an
ordinary and proportionate means of preserving life” and “therefore obligatory.”  Similarly, for
patients in a permanent vegetative state, who are being maintained artificially with nutrition
and hydration, there can be no discontinuance of this care even when a medical judgment is
made that patient consciousness will never occur. FURROW ET AL., supra note 225, at 310–11. R
The authority and force of this means of policymaking has been questioned when other, more
established vehicles for setting policy are available. Id. at 310–11 (referencing John Hardt &
Kevin O’Rourke, Nutrition and Hydration: The Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, In
Perspective, 88 HEALTH PROGRESS 1 (2007)). But see U.S. Bishops’ Pro-Life Committee,
Nutrition and Hydration: Moral and Pastoral Reflections, in BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE HISTORY, METHODS, AND PRACTICE, supra note 156, at 417, 419 (showing where, under R
Moral Principles (5), the Committee concluded in 1996: “In the final stage of dying one is not
obliged to prolong the life of a patient by every possible means: ‘When inevitable death is
imminent in spite of the means used, it is permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse
forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life,
so long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not interrupted.’”). See
also ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION AND HYDRATION AND THE PERMANENTLY UNCONSCIOUS PATIENT:
THE CATHOLIC DEBATE (Ronald P. Hamel & James J. Walter eds. 2007); Alan Sanders, The
Clinical Reality of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration for Patients at The End of Life, 9 NAT’L
CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 293 (2009); see generally RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES IN BIOETHICS 1–20
(John F. Peppin, Mark J. Cherry & Ana Iltis eds. 2004).
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issue in 2001.299  While recognizing that artificial nutrition and hydration
were developed to accommodate acutely ill patients and provide short-
term care, the AAHPM also acknowledged current data that suggested
these procedures neither prolong life nor prevent suffering.300  Since pa-
tients in end-stage illnesses often lose their capacity to eat and drink, the
ethical issue thus becomes whether patients, their families, or caregivers
should have the right at all to request the provision or withholding of
nutrition, alimentation, and hydration to those with no prospects of reha-
bilitation or recovery.
The AAHPM concluded that ANH should always be recognized as
medical therapy and should be evaluated by balancing its costs and bene-
fits (or benefits and burdens) “in light of the patient’s goals of care and
clinical circumstances.”301  While acknowledging that ANH has sym-
bolic value and importance for some patients and their families, the
AAHPM prefers that lines of communication be maintained among
health care providers who not only deal with fears of starvation by af-
flicted patients and their families, but with clarifications of the clinical
conditions which come with end-stage illness.302  More specifically, pa-
tient information should be provided explaining that an individual’s in-
ability to both eat and drink are a part of the “normal” process of
dying.303  Accordingly, when efforts at ANH are not advancing a pa-
tient’s goals nor seen as consistent with sound clinical standards of prac-
tice, and thus are futile,304 these efforts “can be ethically withheld or
withdrawn.”305
While there are reports that suggest the use of terminal sedation is
now endorsed by many hospices—with some hospices inducing coma
through an added morphine drip to address unremitting pain306—the
AAHPM’s Statement on Palliative Sedation, issued in 2006, is clear that
299 Statement on Artificial Nutrition and Hydration Near the End of Life, AM. ACAD. OF
HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE MED., http://www.aahpm.org/positions/default/nutrition.html, (last
visited Oct. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Position Statement].
300 Id.; see DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE, 80–82 (2000) (observing
that artificial nutrition and hydration were originally for short-term treatments for post surgical
patients but, over the years, have been transformed into Basic Care rather than regarded as
treatment—this, in spite of the fact that the process of dying is recognized as being accompa-
nied by the inability to take food and water).




305 Charlotte F. Allen, Back Off!, I’m Not Dead Yet!, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2007, at B1;
Position Statement, supra note 299. R
306 See generally Balfour Mount, Morphine Drips, Terminal Sedation, and Slow Euthana-
sia: Definitions and Facts, Not Anecdotes, 12 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 31 (1996) (arguing that a
morphine drip is merely a euphemism for slow euthanasia and incompatible with the principle
of double-effect and palliative care).
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palliative sedation must be “proportionate to the patient’s level of dis-
tress.”307  Reserved only for those cases of the “most severe, intractable
suffering at the very end of life,”308 palliative sedation to unconscious-
ness is supported ethically and legally when three conditions are met: the
intent of the clinician is to relieve a patient’s suffering, the degree of
sedation administered is proportionate to the severity of that suffering,
and the patient or the patient’s surrogate decision-maker provide an in-
formed patient consent that is consistent with the patient’s treatment
goals and personal values.309
This bold and compassionate action by the AAHPM is designed to
educate the public to the validity of accepting physician-assisted death
under certain medically futile conditions by integrating palliative care
and its philosophies into a standard of appropriate care for the terminally
ill.310  By changing the taxonomy of the act itself from the traditional
“Physician-Assisted Suicide” (PAS) to “Physician-Assisted Death”
(PAD), the AAHPM is attempting to recast the debate as a discussion
over the legality of receiving medical assistance in the dying process.311
V. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE OR EUTHANASIA: ENDURING
EPHEMERAL DISTINCTIONS?
As a matter of principle, it is difficult to find and defend present
distinctions between physician assisted suicide and euthanasia.312  In-
stead of falling into a taxonomical quagmire, physicians traditionally as-
307 Statement on Palliative Sedation, AM. ACAD. OF HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE MED.,
http://www.aahpm.org/positions/default/sedation.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Physician-Assisted Death, AM. ACAD. OF HOSPICE AND PALLIATIVE MED., http://
www.aahpm.org/positions/default/suicide.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2008); see generally
Smith, Terminal Sedation, supra note 36 (advocating greater acceptance of assisted dying in R
certain circumstances).
311 See Smith, All’s Well That Ends Well, supra note 37 (arguing for a taxonomical R
change in terminology which accepts and uses enlightened self-determination or assisted ra-
tional suicide rather than assisted suicide).
312 Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at The
End of Life and Personal Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1474 (2008); see RICHARD A.
POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 235–45 (1995) (maintaining that there should be a right to
assisted suicide); see also Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize and Regu-
late Physician Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 10 (1996).  Interestingly, in Vacco,
the Supreme Court found no legal relevance between the classic distinctions between either
active or passive euthanasia or, as well, between “the provision of artificial fluids and nutrition
and other medical interventions.”  Annas, supra note 48, at 1099.  What was, however, seen as R
determinative by the court was causation and physician intent in prescribing or in administer-
ing medications which have a direct or even indirect role in hastening death. Id.  The New
York State Task Force on Life and the Law, in issuing its 1997 supplement to its 1994 report,
When Death is Sought, concluded that valid distinctions between assisted suicide, the refusal
of treatment, and the administration of high opioid dosages for refractory pain were essential
for coherent policies in end-of-life medical care and that the latter two treatments should in no
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sess a patient by determining whether their condition is curative,
rehabilitative, or palliative.313  The principle of medical futility has been
most helpful in making a medical assessment; through its use and imple-
mentation, physicians have clear markers and protocols for non-treat-
ment.314  Consistent with the lack of national cognizance of a right or
liberty interest to seek assistance from a physician in ending one’s life,315
no state courts—save one in Montana316—have found a right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide within their state constitutions.  Similarly, no state
legislatures, other than in Oregon317 and Washington,318 have legalized
this type of action319 in the post-Glucksberg era.320
Rather than continue efforts to find meaningful distinctions between
suicide and assisted suicide, a clearer strategy would be to structure dia-
logue around references to aid in dying or physician-assisted dying.321
Indeed, since Glucksberg recognized terminal or palliative sedation, the
essence of assisted suicide has not been germane to any discussion of
end-of-life care.322
way be considered an act of euthanasia. COMM. ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE 12 (1997).
313 See F. Fox Predominance of the Curative Model of Medical Care: A Residual Pro-
gram, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 761 (1997); Sapir, supra note 60. R
314 Smith, Futility and the Principle of Medical Futility, supra note 50. R
315 Kamisar, supra note 312, at 1467. R
316 On December 5, 2008, a Montana District Court determined in the case of Baxter v.
Montana that there is a fundamental right for the terminally ill to die with dignity; that the
state law barring assisted suicide violates the right to privacy guaranteed by the state constitu-
tion and the provision that proclaims the dignity of the human being is inviolable.  2008 Mont.
Dist. LEXIS 482, at *36 (Dec. 5, 2008).  The decision was appealed, and in its ruling on this
appeal on December 31, 2009, the Montana Supreme Court declined to declare a constitutional
right to die with dignity. Baxter v. State, 2009 Mont. LEXIS 695 (Dec. 31, 2009).  Rather, the
court held that physicians aid in dying was not violating the stated legislation protecting the
terminally ill nor against state public policy. Id.
317 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800(12), 127.805 (2005).
318 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 70,245 (West 2009).
319 Kamisar, supra note 312, at 1467. R
320 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
321 Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratory of the States: The Progress of Glucksberg’s
Invitation to States to Address End-of-Life Choices, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1593 (2008).
322 Id. at 1599 n.23 (noting the American Medical Association’s brief amicus curiae in
Vacco and Glucksberg which endorsed the proper medical use of palliative sedation).  Writing
for the majority in Vacco, Chief Justice Rehnquist recognizes that a state may allow palliative
care for patients refusing unwanted medical treatment “which may have the foreseen but unin-
tended ‘double effect’ of hastening . . . death.”  521 U.S. 793, 808 n.11 (1997). But see David
Orientleicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Suicide Embracing Eu-
thanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 947, 955–56 (1997) (concluding terminal sedation is a
form of active, voluntary or slow euthanasia).
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A. The Scope of Personal Autonomy
If personal autonomy, or “the right to define one’s own concept of
existence” and “the mystery of human life,”323 extends to the very time
and manner of one’s death,324 this fundamental right, arguably, should
not be limited to the terminally ill325 and the “seriously ill or impaired
who are suffering or in pain.”326  Indeed, others have expressed concern
that if this right is recognized nationally, it will be asserted not only by
those patients who are terminally ill,327 but also those who are “seriously
ill or impaired . . . endur[ing] pain or suffering.”328
Specifically, concerns have been raised that the standard of terminal
illness, in and of itself, is inadequate to measure certain medical condi-
tions that exceed a diagnosis of life expectancy beyond, for example, the
more “normal” period of three months329 or six months.330  Three partic-
ular scenarios have been posited as being dangerous because of the
“open-ended” or limitless nature of present evaluations of terminal ill-
ness:331 (1) where a patient might be suffering from Lou Gehrig’s dis-
ease, yet the patient is not diagnosed as fully suffering from the end-
stage of the disease; (2) where a patient, afflicted with paralysis from the
neck down can survive with palliative care for some twenty years; or, (3)
where a patient is in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease.332
323 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
324 Kamisar, supra note 312, at 1474. R
325 Id. at 1459.
326 Id. at 1471, 1472.
327 Id. at 1473.  For Yale Kamisar, the supreme value of human life always trumps an
exercise of autonomy or self-determination designed, as such, to end life.  Yet, interestingly,
while he maintains that it is acceptable to honor a patient’s wish to end an intolerably burden-
some existence by ceasing medical treatment deemed futile, Kamisar would deny assistance to
that individual to end his life. YOUNG, supra note 145, at 57.  While Kamisar maintains fur- R
ther that a “critical moral significance” is to be found between an act and an omission, others
assert the “distinction” between acts and omissions and between killing and letting die has no
moral significance at all. Id. at 56–58.  Callahan also characterizes the withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration as morally legitimate.  Daniel Callahan, Terminal Sedation and The
Artefactual Fallacy, in TERMINAL SEDATION: EUTHANASIA IN DISGUISE? 93–102 (Torbjorn
Tannsjo ed. 2004).
328 Kamisar, supra note 312, at 1473; see Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 22 R
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 10, 14 (Mar.-April 1992).  The right to forego medical treatment is recog-
nized as “virtually absolute” and in no way limited to the terminally ill.  1 ALAN MEISEL, THE
RIGHT TO DIE § 8.2 (2d ed. 1995).
329 Tucker, supra note 321, at 1610 n.90 (referencing the California Compassionate R
Choices Act introduced in 2007 which was not enacted into legislation).
330 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800 (12), 127.805 (2005).
331 Kamisar, supra note 312, at 1472. R
332 Id.  The case of Mrs. Janet Adkins is illustrative of a patient suffering from
Alzheimer’s disease who—before succumbing to debilitating effects of the disease and thereby
losing her competency—decided, with the support of her family, to seek assistance in commit-
ting suicide, in Michigan, with Dr. Jack Kevorkian.  On June 4, 1990, with her death, Mrs.
Adkins became the first publicly reported case in the United States of medically assisted sui-
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In each of these hypotheticals, no rigid timeline can delineate a pa-
tient’s personal standard of hopelessness.  If an informed unilateral deci-
sion is made to end one’s life in the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease,
before levels of incompetence and indignity occur, then surely that deci-
sion must be accepted.  The principle of medical futility applies equally
to all three scenarios because in each case, there are simply no available
options for curative care or rehabilitation.  Rather than be concerned with
the misapplication of the terminal illness standard in these three specific
cases, the opportunity to embrace individuals presenting these
symptomologies should be guided by compassion and mercy because
there is no hope of a qualitative recovery.333
cide.  George P. Smith, II Reviving the Swan, Extending the Curse of Methuselah, or Adhering
to the Kevorkian Ethic?, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 49, 51 (1993).
Being an Alzheimer disease patient does not preclude that individual from being recog-
nized, legally, as competent to make health care decisions regarding treatment or non-treat-
ment if the decision-making is undertaken in the early onset stage of the disease before
recognition is lost. ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE
ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 281 (1989); see WERTH, supra note 69, at 76; see R
generally Mitchell et al., supra note 121 (observing that patients with advanced dementia who R
were able to discuss the disease’s prognosis with their health care proxies received less bur-
densome interventions than those whose proxies who did not understand the expected
complications).
The double assisted suicide, on July 10, 2009, of the renowned musical conductor, Sir
Edward Downes, 85, virtually blind, suffering from a loss of hearing and in psychological
distress—although not in a terminal medical condition—and his wife, Lady Downes, 74, who
was suffering from terminal cancer, has raised, anew, concerns that death is becoming a “lifes-
tyle choice.”  Both Sir Edward and his wife traveled to a private assisted suicide clinic in
Zurich, Switzerland, called Dignitas.  Of some 117 Britons who have availed themselves of
Dignitas the past years, at least five were not—at the time of their deaths—considered to be in
a terminal condition.  Nick Allen & Caroline Gammell, Conductor’s Son Saw Parent’s Die in
Suicide Clinic, DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 15, 2009, at 7; David Brown & Helen Nugent, ‘To-
gether Forever’ Couple Raise New Suicide Fears, THE TIMES (London), July 15, 2009, at 1.
In a British case in 2004, Local Authority v. Z, EWHC 2817 (Fam), the Court held a
woman suffering from a terminal medical condition—cerebella ataxia—who wished to travel
to Switzerland with the assistance of her husband to be euthanized, could not be enjoined from
such a course of action.  Although the Suicide Act of 1961 would, indeed, criminalize the
actions of the woman’s husband because they would aid or abet her illegal act of suicide, the
law of suicide did not criminalize the conduct.  The court concluded that although Parliament
may criminalize an act, “it is not always in the public interest to prosecute in respect of it.”
KERRIDGE ET AL., supra note 227, at 655–56. R
Relative Assisted Suicide (RAS) and, more specifically, Relative Facilitating Suicide
Abroad (RFASA), has the real potential to resolve the furor over physician-assisted death if it
is accepted legislatively and judicially.  Indeed, when British prosecutors have essentially
given a relative exemption for assisting terminally ill family members, in some limited number
of cases, they have advanced the de-medicalization of assisted dying and thereby relegated the
role of the physician to that of determining the competency of the terminal, end-of-life person
to request assistance in dying and providing a drug prescription to effect that purpose.  Ost,
De-Medicalisation of Assisted Dying, supra note 64, at 515–17, 533. R
333 See Adrienne M. Martin, Hope and Exploitation, 38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 49 (2008)
(concluding hope should be viewed as a complex emotion which inputs value judgments and
deliberative processes and—thus—should not be exploited to the point of being false or, at
best, bereft of an accurate factual or scientific basis).
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut334
and Eisenstadt v. Baird335 were foundational in recognizing a right to
privacy from government intrusions.  These decisions were crucial sup-
port in the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas in 2003, which held the
Texas Homosexual Conduct law was an unconstitutional abridgment of
the right to liberty under the Due Process Clause.336  In Lawrence, the
Court determined that sexual intimacy among same-sex couples was a
freedom not limited by any spatial bounds.337  Rather, the liberty of per-
sons must be recognized inherently as “an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”338
Moreover, the Court recognized that people are entitled to “dignity as
free persons.”339  Over time, it may even be possible that decisions post-
Lawrence may find a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide
within the Constitution.340  For the “foreseeable future,” however, the
Glucksberg rule remains.341
B. The Limits of State Interest
Limits must be placed on the state’s parens patriae powers to inter-
fere with autonomous and informed decisions by citizens who wish to be
relieved of their pain and suffering in futile medical conditions with no
curative hope of rehabilitation or sustained qualitative existence, men-
tally or physically.  Indeed, “there is a realm of personal liberty which
the government may not enter.”342  Linked with this right of self-deter-
mination is the equally important right to beneficent treatment that ad-
vances the best interests of the distressed.343  These two rights are
fundamental to any and all decisions regarding health care treatment.344
When considering terminally ill patients or those diagnosed with a futile
medical condition, the state’s general interest in protecting or even en-
forcing a continuance of life surely must be trumped by the right of self-
334 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
335 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
336 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
337 Id.
338 Id. at 564–65.
339 Id.
340 Kamisar, supra note 312, at 1466. R
341 Id.
342 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
343 See THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 58. R
344 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  Artificial alimentation
(e.g., nourishment) and hydration are not readily distinguishable “from other forms of medical
treatment,” and, as such, can be refused by a competent patient exercising his “liberty interest”
in refusing such treatments.  497 U.S. at 287–88 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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determination to make one of life’s most intimate, private decisions:
when to die.345
C. Resolving Ambiguity: Toward a Resolution—State Action
The growing idea of integrating the issue of physician-assisted sui-
cide or death with proper efforts to manage intractable pain may well
prove to be the ideal construct for accepting and validating medical assis-
tance in hastening death where it is deemed medically proper and hu-
mane.346  State statutes are being enacted which allow for the delivery of
“adequate pain relief” and exempt this conduct from liability under both
criminal law and state medical licensing guidelines, so long as the medi-
cal actions are “in accord with accepted guidelines” for relieving intrac-
table pain.347
VI. SHAPING A CARING RESPONSE: A MEDICO-LEGAL CHALLENGE
Health care providers’ role of caring may be seen as a moral obliga-
tion rooted in the time-honored principle of beneficence, the goal of
which is to promote patient well-being.348  “Caring indubitably incorpo-
rates empathy,”349 but incorporating it into the management of the termi-
nally ill is difficult.  For the physician to convey to a patient that “I could
be you,” involves initiating a sympathetic response that may begin as
early as during the taking of the patient history.350  During this process, a
one-on-one relationship commences, which opens a line of communica-
tion between the treating physician and the patient.  This, in turn, pro-
vides a mechanism for the physician to assess and identify the emotions
the terminally ill patient is experiencing, the reason for the display of
emotion, and a response to the patient which allows the patient to see that
the physician has “connect[ed]” the emotion and its root cause.351
A physician’s empathetic response has the direct effect of assuring
the patient that they will not be abandoned in their final days.  For many
345 CALLAHAN, supra note 300, at 107–08 (1993); Erwin Chemerinsky, Washington v. R
Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1501 (2008).
346 FURROW ET AL., supra note 225, at 43. R
347 Id.  Indeed, some twenty-one states have these pain relief laws and seven states allow
specifically for use of medical marijuana.  For a complete listing of the state statutes, see State
Pain Relief Acts, PAIN & L., http://www.painandthelaw.org/statutes/state_pain_acts.php (last
visited Feb. 25, 2011).  Interestingly, the federal government has been unsuccessful in enacting
pain and relief legislation, which would allow the presumption of controlled substances in
order to manage refractory pain. See Pain Relief Promotion Act, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong.
(1999); Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, S. 1272, 106th Cong. (1999).
348 Paul Rousseau, The Fears of Death and The Physician’s Responsibility to Care for the
Dying, 18 AM. J. HOSP. & PALLIATIVE CARE 224 (July–Aug. 2001).
349 Id.
350 Id. at 225.
351 Id.
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physicians, however, non-abandonment is instinctively difficult to honor
because of “the fear generated by confrontation of their own mortality
when caring for a dying patient.”352  Because of this situation, patient
avoidance, even when unintentional, only serves to heighten patient fears
of impending death.353
Because of these concerns and inadequacies among physicians, is-
sues of existential care are more often than not left to the nursing staff.354
Even in the daily hospital bed environment, however, the nursing staff
must possess a special level of sensitivity to understand patients’ indirect
questions regarding the depth and severity of their distress over their ter-
minal illness.  Once understood, it typically falls upon the nurses to de-
vise a procedure for providing empathetic support.355
A. Alleviating Suffering
Autonomy emerged in the twentieth century as the dominant or cap-
stone principle in biomedical ethics, supporting and complementing the
principles of beneficence, non-malfeasance, and distributive justice.356  It
has also played a dominant role in complex cases of refractory pain.  In-
deed, in cases where one’s quality of life is so severely diminished be-
cause of suffering, it is arguably necessary to reconfigure or enhance
autonomy so that compassion becomes the operative bioethical principle
in decision-making.357  In scenarios where end-of-life pain is intractable,
efforts to address this condition and thereby assure a dignified death be-
come a paramount state interest.
The goal of alleviating suffering, if acknowledged as a right to re-
lief, imposes upon both the state and health care providers a coordinate
responsibility to make prudential judgments that validate this right.358
Acknowledging such a right then becomes an act of “responsible benevo-
lence”359 and is seen properly as complementing the duty to undertake
352 Id.
353 Id.; see generally J. S. Felton, Burnout as a Clinical Entity: Its Importance in Health
Care Workers, 48 OCCUP. HEALTH 237 (1998) (discussing the elements that lead to burnout
among those workers in the health care field, as well as ways to prevent or counteract the
effects of burnout).
354 Robert Hoatpen & David Hendrikx, Nurses and The Vicissitudes of Dealing with Eu-
thanasia Questions in Terminal Palliative Care, 10 NURSING ETHICS 377 (2003).
355 Id.
356 Jonsen, supra note 57; see generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: R
MEDICAL, SOCIO-LOCAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAVE NEW WORLD (1993)
(recognizing the three pillars of Autonomy, Beneficence, and Justice as vital to the modern
understanding of bioethics).
357 Shepherd, Sophie’s Choice, supra note 12, at 106, 126. R
358 Id. at 146.
359 LIEZL VAN ZYL, DEATH AND COMPASSION: A VIRTUE-BASED APPROACH TO EUTHANA-
SIA 197 (2000).
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actions that benefit the dying patient.360  The duty to relieve pain is ac-
knowledged as the “least disputed and most universal of the moral obli-
gations of the physician.”361  End-of-life autonomy is actually fortified
by, and through, this new right of compassion.  Compassion, then, neces-
sarily becomes the denominator in health care decisions for end-of-life
care,362 and demands that efforts not only refrain from causing pain or
suffering, but also work to relieve it.363
B. Legal Caring Responses in a Just Society
American history shows rather remarkably that the capacity to care
has often been seen as antithetical, rather than vital, to maintenance of a
just society.364  Consequently, there “has been a deformation of both the
private ethic care and the very public ethic of legal justice.”365  This, in
turn, has meant that not only have the ideals and practices of justice been
uncaring, but that the ideals and practices of care “have been unjust,”
resulting in a “deflation of both values.”366  Rather than viewing caregiv-
ing as an emotional, morally arbitrary response, it should be properly
accepted as an ethical activity “integral to development of a just soci-
ety.”367  Indeed, care or compassion must be recognized as a universal
moral principle368 that is vital to the very fabric of social justice.369
It has been suggested that within every adjudication, neutral princi-
ples of law, or those standards which transcend the instant case, should
operate.370  Perhaps these principles or standards are to be found within
the very principle of equity.371  From this equity flows mercy, sympathy,
360 THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 58. R
361 Id. at 194 (quoting Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino).
362 Id. at 126.
363 Margaret P. Battin, ENDING LIFE: ETHICS AND THE WAY WE DIE 90, 91 (2005).
364 ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 7, 9 (1997); see MICHAEL FINE, A CARING SOCI-
ETY? 52–74 (2007).
365 WEST, supra note 364, at 9; see JONATHAN HERRING, OLDER PEOPLE IN LAW AND R
SOCIETY 127 (2009).
366 WEST, supra note 364 at 9. R
367 FINE, supra note 364, at 63; HERRING, supra note 365, at 125–27. R
368 FINE, supra note 364, at 61; Jonsen, supra note 286, at 126. R
369 See generally MARIAN BARNES, CARING AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2006) (considering de-
velopments in care-giving and its relationship to social justice).
370 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17, 29
(1959).
371 See generally WILLIAM Q. DEFUNIAK, HANDBOOK ON MODERN EQUITY (2d ed. 1956)
(discussing the requisite elements of equity in tort, property, and contract law); Garrard Glenn
& Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 756 (1945)
(quoting Blackstone’s idea that “equity exists for corrections of situations wherein the law, by
reason of its universality, is deficient.”).
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compassion, humaneness, and love.372  David Hume, the eighteenth-cen-
tury British philosopher, opined that the basis for a system of justice and
social solidarity was tied to expressions of natural sympathy for
others.373  German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer maintained that
compassion “is the real basis of all voluntary justice.”374  Accordingly,
for an action to have moral value, it must derive from compassion.375
Compassion is defined as an acknowledgment of another’s suffering
which prompts a response to assist in alleviating the suffering, and is
often regarded as the motivation for subsequent merciful acts.376  Mercy
is oftentimes used synonymously with compassion or benevolence.377
Indeed, acts of this nature have been termed “responsible benevo-
lence,”378 or “compassionate mercy.”379
For others, charity is seen as the ultimate value in caring for the
dying;380 beneficence and benevolence may combine to become “loving
charity.”381  The elimination or management of suffering is so central to
this attitude that it can well be seen as trumping the biomedical principle
of autonomy.382
In contemporary society, it has been urged that sympathy and com-
passion must be integrated into the fabric of the law.383  A modern and
principled rule of law, then, needs notions of decency and compassion
within its sinews384 and does not have to conflict with a rule of love.385
372 Equity is defined as not only “the quality of being equal or fair” but, “given in accor-
dance with natural justice . . . something fair and right.”  5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 358
(2d ed. 1989).
373 Paul T. Menzel, Justice and the Basic Structure of Health Care Systems in MEDICINE
AND SOC. JUST. 261, 262 (Rosamund Rhodes, Margaret P. Battin & Anita Silvers eds. 2002).
374 WILLIAM S. SAHAKIAN & MABEL LEWIS SAHAKIAN, IDEAS OF THE GREAT PHILOSO-
PHER 49 (1993).
375 See id.
376 Steven Tudor, Modes of Mercy, 28 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 79, 95 (2003); see
also Guinan, The Christian Origin of Medical Compassion, 5 NAT’L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q.
21 (2005); Martha C. Nussbaum, Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion, 13 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 27 (1996).
377 Tudor, supra note 376, at 81. R
378 VAN ZYL, supra note 359, at 197. R
379 Battin, supra note 363, at 66; see also TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH AND DIGNITY: MAK- R
ING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 131 (1994).
380 Pellegrino, Decision at the End of Life, supra note 147. R
381 Id. at 225, 241.
382 Shepherd, Sophie’s Choice, supra note 12, at 106, 119. R
383 Laurence H. Tribe, Revisiting the Rule of Law, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 726, 729 (1989).
384 Id. at 731.
385 Id. at 729; see FLETCHER, supra note 57 (arguing that so long as one’s intention to act R
is anchored in love, the end result justifies the means).  For Fletcher, the Situation Ethic is a
variant or sub-set of moral ethics, which, in turn, holds that ethics are relative to culture,
immediate circumstances and specific individual needs. See generally SAMUEL FLEIS-
CHACKER, INTEGRITY AND MORAL RELATIVISM (1992) (taking a relativistic approach to a sys-
tem of ethics, values, and morals); Hugh LaFollette, The Truth in Ethical Relativism, 22 J.
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Others have called for the law to be empathetic, a term often used inter-
changeably with love, altruism, and sympathy.386
One of the inherent weaknesses of the rule of law has been said to
be its all too often efforts to distance itself from human experience.387  A
strong claim could be made that introducing human values or attitudes
into the judicial process would conflict with the idea of judgment sus-
tained by rational and objective argumentation, not feelings and emo-
tions.388  Thus, empathetic discourse runs the risk of being seen as
irrelevant and dismissed.389
C. Principles, Emotions, and The Holmesian Caveat
While principles provide the foundational framework for standards
of normative conduct, feelings are important when individuals or discrete
SOC. PHIL. 146, 146–54 (eschewing routine application of existing moral rules and, instead,
stressing that a “cultivated moral judgment” should be the normative standard of conduct).
386 Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1579–82 (1987).
For Adam Smith, the process of judging involves a lesson in learning the importance of impar-
tiality by imagining how an impartial spectator would act in a particular situation.  “Moral
judgment is either approval or disapproval of an action.  Judging is a complex matter and
forms the last step in a process” relying upon the capacity of humans to sympathize—not show
compassion but, in a neutral way—express empathy. GEOFF COCKFIELD, ANN FIRTH & JOHN
LAURENT, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ADAM SMITH’S “THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS” 71
(2007); see RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 117 (2008) (observing that an element of
“good judgment” in judicial decision-making is “empathy” and “common sense”).
387 See generally JOHN NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976) (recasting the
study of the law through a person-centric viewpoint, focusing on those affected by the law and
its changes).
388 Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney and the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1101, 1122 (1990). But see MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CARING AND JUSTICE (2000).
389 Henderson, supra note 386, at 1588; see Dan Balz, Empathy and Judicial Picks Rarely R
Mix on Capitol Hill, WASH. POST, May 3, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/02/AR2009050202081.html (observing Senator Graham’s
concern that the “empathy test” for judicial appointments is “a dangerous road to go down”);
Michael A. Fletcher, Obama Names Judges to Appeals Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2009, at
A4 (reporting on Obama’s interest in getting judicial nominees who show “empathy” and a
conservative advocacy group’s response that that such a quality “has nothing to do with a
judge’s work of interpreting statutes and the Constitution” and, furthermore, does not set a
clear focus on whom a judge should show empathy); Peter Slevin, Obama Makes Empathy a
Requirement for Court, WASH. POST, May 13, 2009, at A3 (reporting on the President’s efforts
to recruit judicial candidates to the federal bench who have a “capacity to understand others,”
thereby renewing the concerns of some that such individuals would show sympathies for par-
ticular groups from the bench). But see Douglas W. Kmiec, The Case for Empathy, AMERICA,
May 11, 2009, available at http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=
11649. See generally LOU AGOSTA, EMPATHY IN THE CONTEXT OF PHILOSOPHY (using philo-
sophical methods to expose empathy as fundamental to the human community); FRANS DE
WAAL, THE AGE OF EMPATHY (2009) (describing biological, psychological, and socio-cultural
displays of empathy in humans); David R. Stros & Ryan W. Scott, Review Essay, Navigating
the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869 (2008) (describing the
heavily-politiczed process of Supreme Court nominations and possible reforms by both the
legislative and executive branches).
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issues arise that test the validity of a principle’s application within the
context of a given situation or norm of conduct.390  Scholars assert that
“the morally good person is not just principled, but also compassion-
ate.”391 The “morally good person” exhibits both “practical wisdom”392
and “simple common sense”393 in preserving a patient’s dignity or qual-
ity of life throughout all palliative care treatments.394
The best way to assure this goal while managing a plan of adjusted
palliative care is to embrace a test of medical utility in determining what
end-stage options should be made available as treatment.395  Accord-
ingly, physicians should perform a risk calculus that weighs the benefits
and burdens to assess the utility of various medical treatments.396  In all
cases, the doctrine of medical futility should anchor these evaluations by
acknowledging the practical limits of medical treatment.397
While compassion is experienced and evaluated subjectively,398 it
need not stigmatize a valid legal theory.399  In DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Social Services,400 Justice Blackmun addressed the im-
portance of compassion in judicial analysis and interpretation by observ-
ing that “compassion need not be exiled from the province of
judging.”401  He further stated that when a court removes “natural sym-
pathy,” it is unable to “recogniz[e] the facts of the case before it or the
legal norms that should apply to those facts.”402
Eschewing emotion as a dominant vector of force when seeking the
truth in law,403 Justice Holmes urged that the reasoning behind a particu-
lar rule’s adoption “ought to be of paramount importance.”404  And,
390 RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 125, at 12–13. R
391 Id. at 13.
392 Id. at 24.
393 Id. at 73.
394 Annette F. Street & David W. Kissane, Constructions of Dignity in End-of-Life Care,
17 J. PALLIATIVE CARE 93, 95, 99 (2001); RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 125, at 71. R
395 RANDALL & DOWNIE, supra note 125. R
396 Id. at 116–18.
397 Id.
398 Zipursky, supra note 388, at 1142. R
399 Id. at 1147.  See Lois L. Shepherd, Face to Face: A Call for Radical Responsibility in
Place of Compassion, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 444 at 449, 457 (2003) (calling for a greater
prominence for caring responses in law and a sense of “shared humanity”) [Shepherd, Face to
Face].
400 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1988).
401 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
402 Id. at 213.
403 THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPIN-
IONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 119 (Richard A. Posner ed.
1992).
404 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of The Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1987); see
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 107 (2003) (arguing that ordinary
people have little interest in complex policy and limited intellectual depth—with half of the
population with I.Q.s of below 100).
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when the reasons for structuring the rule have disappeared, it is improper
to maintain the rule, simply due to “blind imitation of the past.”405
The reasons behind the prohibitions and restricted use of terminal
sedation as a means of care in palliative treatment of patients in end-
stage care need to be reevaluated and expanded to include care of pa-
tients suffering severe psychological distress.  Suffering at the end of life
may be physical, psychological, emotional, or existential, and may take
form as despair, feelings of helplessness and isolation, or a basic loss of
self-respect.406  Therefore, a right not to suffer and a professional medi-
cal responsibility to validate this right must be acknowledged.407
D. A Contemporary Model in Legal Decision-Making
The law should accord a greater “caring response”408 or a “sense of
shared humanity”409 in its interpretation and application.  These values
are essential to sustaining the rule of law.410  Often, though, values are
challenged or perceived as being in conflict with “moralistic abstractions
about liberty, equality and dignity.”411
Unquestionably, health care decisions concerning the maintenance
of life and the hastening of death often pose complicated moral questions
which are anchored in normative reasoning which may soon become ir-
relevant because of changing contemporary values.412  If moral reason-
ing is found to be ambiguous or ineffectual, courts will rely on “moral
intuitions,” or “assumptions about intrinsic normative order” found im-
plicitly “in the natural course of life.”413  Analytical frameworks of this
nature invite conflict because of non-verifiable subjective values—this,
because determining normative assumptions which animate moral judg-
ments is very difficult if not indiscernible.414
405 Holmes, supra note 404, at 469; see generally MAGNUSSON, supra note 45; Stephen R
W. Smith, Some Realism About End of Life: The Current Prohibition and the Euthanasia
Underground, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 55 (2007) (arguing in favor of legalizing physician-assisted
suicide and active voluntary euthanasia).
406 VAN ZYL, supra note 359, at 196. R
407 THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 58, at 192. R
408 Shepherd, Face to Face, supra note 399, at 449. R
409 Id. at 457.
410 Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 961, 971 (2008);
see generally Kathryn Webb Bradley, Knowing Law’s Limits: Comments on “Forgiveness:
Integral to Close Relationships and Inimical to Justice?,” 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 322
(2009) (arguing that concepts such as forgiveness have only a limited purpose within the law,
and that society is better off realizing the limitations of law in repairing emotional injuries).
411 Siegel, supra note 410, at 1030. R
412 See Steven D. Smith, De-Moralized: Glucksberg in the Malaise, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1571, 1589 (2008).
413 See id. at 1589–90.
414 See id. at 1589.
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In order to add greater precision to their analyses, courts can choose
to embrace the philosophy of Holmes, which prizes logic over experi-
ence.415  By adhering to legal formalism, moral judgments are avoided
altogether416  This is largely because there is an awareness that it is very
difficult to safeguard and sustain social solidarity if purely emotional val-
ues are given weight during the processes of judicial decision-making.417
If formalism is rejected, however, judicial deference can be given to “tra-
dition and convention”418 as an imperfect means for discerning moral
convictions or discovering shared ones.419
The best model of judicial decision-making achieves a balance be-
tween logical reasoning and “critical morality.”420  As such, the courts
must endeavor to apply a situation ethic rather than an unyielding and
rigid normative standard,421 and then proceed to acknowledge love or
agape as the controlling moral principle in all judicial decision-making.
Stated otherwise, the judiciary should seek to interpret evolving social
values while guided by compassion or humaneness.422  These values and
conditions will necessarily change with the facts of each case and, so too,
will the pertinence of compassion and humaneness.  The ultimate goal of
judicial decision-making should be a “practical realization of the rule of
law.”423
415 See generally Holmes, supra note 403 (collecting various writings from the distin- R
guished Supreme Court Justice that impart his philosophy on jurisprudence).
416 Smith, supra note 412, at 1590. R
417 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543
(2008) (explaining arguments on behalf due process traditionalism and ultimately concluding
that these arguments provide a tenuous defense of judicial decision-making); Siegel, supra
note 410, at 979; see also WILLIAM F. SULLIVAN, EYE OF THE HEART: KNOWING THE HUMAN R
GOOD IN THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE 27–58 (2005).
418 Smith, supra note 412, at 1590. R
419 Id.
420 Id.  Judge Richard Posner suggests that by employing a type of reasoning termed,
“cultural cognition,” which is considered “a valid[,] though flawed[,] sense of knowledge,” a
judge is allowed to consider his personal vision of those policies important to him in order to
advance his model of a good society. Id. “The personal, the emotional and the intuitive” are
factors used in judicial making—with the intuitive being a real factor in appellate review. Id.
at 116, 117.
421 See generally FLETCHER, supra note 385 (arguing for a new approach to ethics R
grounded in love and married to an objective rationale of utility).
422 Siegel, supra note 410, at 981. R
423 Id. at 979; see generally, George P. Smith, II, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of
Biotechnology, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 93 (1999) (calling for courts to
consider the modern refinements of biotechnology in conjunction with social policy in shaping
judicial decisions regarding bioethics).
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CONCLUSION
Patient values must always be viewed as the baseline for developing
and pursuing patient-centered palliative care for terminal illnesses.424
The best patient care adjusts to a patient’s changing medical condition.425
Palliative care provides adjusted care by endeavoring to relieve physical
and psychological end-stage suffering.426  If this is recognized as a right
to relief from suffering,427 as the European Federation for Pain Study
advocates,428 then health care providers and the state have a basic re-
sponsibility to establish policies designed to validate this right and follow
a course of action which seeks to honor the wants and desires of patients
for a dignified death.  Indeed, there is a medical duty to act to benefit the
dying patient, for relief of pain “is the least disputed and most universal
of the moral obligations of the physician.”429  Accordingly, both law and
medicine must set standards or protocols that allow for the wider adop-
tion and use of terminal sedation as an efficacious and humane practice
for end-stage care of patients in hospice.430
Efforts to both accept and adopt a protocol for specifically deter-
mining medical futility431 will be enhanced and legitimized by a wider
adoption of the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act.432  The American
Academy of Palliative Medicine has worked to develop standards for
regulating nutrition and hydration in palliative management.433  The
American Medical Association has also offered guidance on when, clini-
cally and ethically, it is proper to sedate to unconsciousness.434  These
policies are having a salutary effect on both codifying and normalizing
proper medical care and procedures in end-of-life care.  Rousseau,435
Morita,436 and Quill437 have also shown significant gains in proposing a
protocol for the administration of palliative or terminal sedation.  In addi-
tion to providing a framework for principled decision-making in end-
424 Quill, Physician-Assisted Death, supra note 40, at 21. R
425 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 81, at 217; see also PELLEGRINO & R
THOMASMA, supra note 81; THOMASMA, HUMAN LIFE IN THE BALANCE, supra note 81; THOM- R
ASMA & GRABER, supra notes 58. R
426 See supra notes 17–23. R
427 THOMASMA & GRABER, supra note 58, at 192. R
428 See supra notes 72–80; see also Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, R
supra notes 203–14. R
429 Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life, supra note 147. R
430 See supra notes 189–200 and accompanying text. R
431 See, e.g., supra notes 151–63. R
432 See, e.g., supra notes 169–74. R
433 See, e.g., supra notes 297–303. R
434 See, e.g., supra notes 203–11. R
435 See, e.g., supra notes 189–94. R
436 See, e.g., supra notes 101, 114, 200. R
437 See, e.g., supra notes 52, 194, 248. R
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stage care, these actions educate the public on the parameters of appro-
priate medical care and humane treatment for the terminally ill.438
Once a codified framework or template for end-of-life decision-
making emerges, an informed dialogue can begin which addresses
namely one question: is the terminally ill individual exercising rational
thinking in his treatment decisions, which, in turn, validate self-determi-
nation or autonomy?439  If the answer is in the negative and the patient is
deemed incompetent to make end-of-life decisions, the issue then be-
comes whether the health care provider is acting consistent with standard
medical practice440 and endeavoring to make a “value-consequent
choice” consistent with the patient’s values441 and best interests.442  Ulti-
mately, reasonableness443 and compassion444 shape the parameters of a
patient’s best medical interests.  Reasonableness is not capable of a pre-
cise formulation, but—rather—is tied inextricably to fact-sensitive issues
of proportionality or cost-benefit analysis445 which, in turn, are shaped
by the “accepted standards of medical practice” applicable to each medi-
cal case presented.446
The doctrine of medical futility must bring into focus the popular
notion within American society that there is a prescription available for
every circumstance.447  Under this doctrine, when medical care is com-
plemented by the test of proportionality imbedded in the principle of
double-effect, the central question becomes whether the burdens of treat-
438 See, e.g., supra notes 310–311; see Mitchell et al., supra note 121. R
439 SMITH, supra note 89, at 109.  Indeed, a dominant concern in testing the extent to R
which the terminally ill patient is rational and competent to make health care decisions is the
extent to which the decisions are consistent with the patient’s life values. WERTH, supra note
69. R
440 SMITH, supra note 248, at 109. R
441 WERTH, supra note 69; see DAVID H. SMITH, PARTNERSHIP WITH THE DYING: WHERE R
MEDICINE AND MINISTRY SHOULD MEET 15–38, 83–106 (2005); THOMASMA, HUMAN LIFE IN
THE BALANCE, supra note 81, at 169. R
442 SMITH, supra note 89, at 109. R
443 SMITH, supra note 89, at 180. R
444 See PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 81; supra notes 12, 388, 414–23. R
445 See BARRY R. SCHALLER, UNDERSTANDING BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 4 (2008) (using
the term “ethinics” is used to describe the convergence of ethics and economics and recogni-
tion taken of the concern that opens acknowledgment of this convergence is oftentimes
avoided for fear its recognition would in some way dehumanize the process of medical deci-
sion making); Boyle, Enriching Proportionalism, supra note 256 (discussing proportionalism R
as a consequentialist form of moral analysis where, in order to reach a moral judgment, all
aspects of an action—including its side effects—are compared or balanced in terms of their
ultimate effect on the human good).
446 SMITH, supra note 89, at 173–74; see Schneiderman et al., supra note 156 (discerning R
the doctrine of medical futility as the basis of common sense).
447 CALLAHAN, supra note 300, at 203–06; see generally Ost, De-Medicalisation of As- R
sisted Dying, supra note 64 (weighing the benefits and burdens of de-medicalising assisted R
dying); Smith, All’s Well That Ends Well, supra note 37 (arguing for an approach to the dying R
process that respects the self-determined, rational wishes of a dying patient to end their life).
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ment clearly outweigh its benefits to the patient and if it would be inhu-
mane if continued.448  In cases where medical treatment is deemed futile,
terminal sedation should function as part of end-stage total symptom
management and validated as an integral part of palliative management
and adjusted care.
Once end-stage, terminal suffering is managed more effectively, the
law must abandon its reliance on the principle of double effect in deter-
mining whether assistance in ending a life is capital murder or euthana-
sia.  Instead, the legal analysis of end-stage care should pivot on both the
degree of necessity for providing compassionate assistance to dying pa-
tients and an assessment of the soundness of the medical judgment of the
health care providers.  The fundamental part of the end-of-life equation
for making rational medical decisions must always be the patient’s quest
for a dignified death449 or, alternatively, the “least worst death.”450
Rather than continue the quest to establish a constitutional right to
assisted suicide, perhaps the time-honored right to refuse treatment
should be seen as the cornerstone for building a more compassionate and
enlightened ethics of understanding when managing end-of-life issues.451
This right of refusal is not a right to hasten death, but merely a right to
resist unwanted physical invasions.452
448 See supra notes 155–66 and accompanying text.  For patients with advanced demen- R
tia, typical complications will include pneumonia, incontinence, limited verbal communica-
tion, eating difficulties and febrile episodes—all of which are correlated, directly, with
mortality rates of six months.  These distressing symptoms should be palliated rather than
treated aggressively and, thus, inhumanely.  Mitchell et al., supra note 121, at 1529; Sachs, R
supra note 59, at 1596. R
For Callahan, testing the burdens and benefits of treatment modalities is tied ultimately to
the principle of medical futility.  Accordingly, when there is a significant likelihood that the
end result of further treatment will either raise a strong probability of death, entail a very real
probability of death that treatment will bring extended pain and suffering, extend a state of
unconsciousness which is not curative or when available treatment—while promising an ex-
tension of life—increases greatly the near certainty of “a bad death,” then these forms of
treatment are classified as medically futile and improper to undertake. CALLAHAN, supra note
300, at 201–02; see generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, FAMILY VALUES AND THE NEW SOCIETY: R
DILEMMAS OF THE 21ST CENTURY, 217–46 (1998) (explaining various moral and religious
frameworks for making end-of-life decisions); GEORGE P. SMITH, II, LEGAL AND HEALTH
CARE ETHICS FOR THE ELDERLY, 55–68 (1996) (discussing advance directives that allow pa-
tients to prescribe situations in which continued care is undesirable).
449 QUILL, supra note 379, at 51. R
450 MARGARET P. BATTIN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH: ESSAYS IN BIOETHICS ON THE END
OF LIFE (1994); see generally IRA BYOCK, DYING WELL: PEACE AND POSSIBILITIES AT THE END
OF LIFE (1997) (collecting testimonials and anecdotes about terminally ill patients finding love
and reconciliation during the end-stage of life).
451 See MEISEL, supra note 328; Annas, supra note 48, at 1102. R
452 See COMM. ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, 1997 Supplement, supra note 312, at 5. R
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In 1990, Congress enacted the Patient Self-Determination Act,453 a
bold step toward strengthening patient autonomy and the national valida-
tion of the right to refuse treatment.454  This Act requires most hospitals,
nursing homes, health agencies, and HMO’s to advise newly-admitted
patients of information regarding Advance Health Care Directives and
their right to specify if they wish to either accept or refuse specific medi-
cal care.455
When the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act456 is considered, to-
gether with the successful efforts of some states to enact pain relief stat-
utes,457 such as Oregon458 and Washington,459 and medical protocols for
use of palliative care and terminal sedation,460 a powerful arsenal is in
place that bolsters the framework for principled decision-making in end-
of-life care.  These weapons serve to protect and encourage sound, rea-
sonable medical judgments and balance physician powers and protec-
tions with patient autonomy.
Utility comes into play after medical conditions are assessed and
evaluated and a treatment prognosis is charted.461  The principle of medi-
cal futility is tested within the bounds of utility on a case-by-case basis
and determined to be either efficacious or invalid.  Cost-benefit analysis
of treatment benefits is central to a determination of medical futility462
since this is fundamentally a clinical judgment, not an encompassing
moral evaluation or principle on the “worthlessness” of a life.463
453 Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(f), 1396a(w) (1994) (Medicare
and Medicaid, respectively).
454 See Laurence P. Ulrich, The Patient Self-Determination Act: Meeting the Challenges
of Patient Care 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 2454 (2000).
455 Id.
456 See supra notes 169–173 and accompanying text. R
457 See supra note 347. R
458 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800 (12), 127.805 (2005).
459 WASH. REV. CODE ANN., ch. 70,245 (West 2009).
460 See, e.g., supra notes 299–305, for the suggestions of the American Academy of Palli- R
ative Medicine; supra notes 203–11, for the suggestions of the American Medical Association. R
461 See JONATHAN BARON, AGAINST BIOETHICS, 25–50 (2006) (stressing the ineluctable
foundation of utilitarianism as the preferred basis for bioethical decision making); Smith, Fu-
tility and the Principle of Medical Futility, supra note 50. R
462 See generally Vijay N. Joish & Gary M. Oderda, Cost Utility Analysis of Quality
Adjusted Years, 19 J. PAIN & PALLIATIVE CARE PHARMACOTHERAPY 57 (2005) (providing an
overview of cost-utility analysis as an assessment tool in determining the cost-effectiveness of
a course of treatment).  It has been suggested that any determination of futility must be a joint
determination made, as such, by physician, patient and surrogate decision-maker, with the final
determination endeavoring to strike a balance between three criteria: effectiveness, benefit,
and burden—in achieving the patient’s good.  Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life, supra
note 147, at 227. R
463 Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life, supra note 147, at 220, 227; see generally R
Amir Halevy, Medical Futility, Patient Autonomy, and Professional Integrity: Finding the
Appropriate Balance, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 261 (2008) (discussing the need for integrity in the
medical profession to counterbalance patient requests for inappropriate medical treatment).
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Whether the operable normative standard for policy-making is termed
agape,464 charity,465 compassion,466 love,467 or mercy,468 the common
unifying denominator in palliative care is a humane, morally responsible
approach to dealing with intractable suffering at the end-stage of life.
Judicial decisionmakers, just as health care providers, must exercise
good judgment.  Good judgment is characterized as “an elusive . . . com-
pound of empathy, modesty, maturity, a sense of proportion, balance, a
recognition of human limitations, sanity, prudence, a sense of reality and
common sense.”469  This elusive trait must be the norm when making
medicolegal decisions, not the exception.
To initiate or continue medically futile treatment should be recog-
nized as simply wrong; for, acting in such a manner not only denies the
fact of human finitude, but it imposes unnecessary effort, expense, and
emotional trauma on both the patient and other affected third parties.470
When physicians attempt to treat futile medical conditions, such actions
are a total abnegation of one of the cardinal principles of medical eth-
ics—beneficence.471
It has been argued persuasively that while the state may declare a
legitimate interest in morality,472 it cannot easily sacrifice “claims of as-
sociational autonomy”473 found in “expressive [or] intimate associa-
tion”474 in order to protect public morality.  Accordingly, care must be
taken by the state to eschew administrative, judicial, or legislative deter-
minations that abridge “choices central to personal dignity and auton-
omy . . . central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”475
464 Defined as a sense of Christian love, charity.  1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 243 (2d
ed. 1998).
465 Defined as Christian love.  3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 42 (2d ed. 1998); see
Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life, supra note 147, at 241 (where charity is advanced as R
an attribute of end-of-life care and treatment).
466 Defined as pity.  3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 597 (2d ed. 1998).
467 Defined as benevolence.  4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 52 (2d ed. 1998); see
Fletcher, supra note 57. R
468 Defined as mercy, showing compassion or kindness.  9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
626 (2d ed. 1998).
469 POSNER, supra note 386, at 117 (emphasis added); see Schneiderman et al., supra note R
156, at 409 (regarding the basis of common sense). R
470 Pellegrino, Decision at The End of Life, supra note 147, at 233–35. R
471 Id. at 223; see generally PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 81 (summarizing R
forms of euthanasia and suggesting legislative and public policy movements toward
euthanasia).
472 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1935–36 (2004).
473 Id. at 1936.
474 Id.
475 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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It is logical to assume that the right to compassionate care in end-
stage illness is grounded in a liberty interest and cannot be unduly chal-
lenged or restricted by a state interest in judging the “morality” of auton-
omous actions designed to give purpose and promote dignity.476
Society’s central obligation is not to mandate one moral code over an-
other but rather, to define and safeguard “the liberty of all”477 and pro-
mote social policies which address suffering with charity, compassion,
and common sense.478  Inextricable to this societal obligation is recogni-
tion of a coordinate duty of health care providers “not to prolong dy-
ing.”479  This duty arguably coalesces with, and validates, the very
principle of beneficence,480 and thereby shapes a new “right” of the ter-
minally ill to be free from refractory pain and existential suffering at the
end-stage of life.481
The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law concludes its
1997 supplemental Report, When Death is Sought, with an aspirational
call to action that serves as a telling indictment of the tragic state of
health care delivery at the end-of-life stage:
The widespread public interest in physician-assisted sui-
cide represent[s] a symptom of a much larger problem:
our collective failure to respond adequately to the suffer-
ing that patients often experience at the end of life.  Im-
proving palliative care, and attending to the
psychological, spiritual, and social need of dying pa-
tients, must be a critical national priority.482
Acceptance, or even approval, of the right of the terminally ill to
receive assistance in ending their lives has grown in the United States, as
476 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 578 (2003).
477 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.  The right of privacy from governmental intrusions, expressed
in Griswold and Eisenstadt, add to the strength of the liberty of associational expression found
in Lawrence, in arguing for a right to die with dignity without unduly burdensome state inter-
ference. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
478 THOMASMA, HUMAN LIFE IN THE BALANCE, supra note 81, at 195; SMITH, supra note R
89, at 83–96. R
479 THOMASMA, HUMAN LIFE IN THE BALANCE, supra note 81, at 195.  This duty should R
be triggered when one is diagnosed as terminally ill, has made a determination (or executed an
advance directive) that, because of medical conditions, life no longer has personal meaning or,
when, even though no such decision has been made by the patient and there is no advance
directive, there is nonetheless a medical realization that the terminal illness is “in its imminent
phase.” THOMASMA, HUMAN LIFE IN THE BALANCE, supra note 81, at 194. R
480 PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 81. R
481 See Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, supra note 9; see also R
Berger, supra note 37, at 32. R
482 COMM. ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, supra note 312, at 12. R
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seen by the states of Oregon483 and Washington,484 and in parts of Eu-
rope, notably, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland.485  This ac-
ceptance should not be stymied by the fear that these actions will force
society onto a slippery slope that ends in the unequivocal endorsement
and unrestricted practice of active euthanasia.486  Rather than allowing
fear to serve as an excuse for passivity or ineptitude, public policy and
contemporary standards of normative conduct should be grounded in
simple notions of compassionate dignity, beneficence, mercy, or charity
in end-of-life decision-making.  This conduct will lead ideally to the sim-
ple recognition of a human right to avoid intractable somatic and non-
somatic pain and suffering.  Individuals must have the right to be free
from the cruel and unusual punishment487 of being forced to live on de-
spite futile medical conditions.488
The slippery slope is, in reality, nothing more than the inescapable
human condition.489  The common duty of man is but to “struggle along”
in reaching a common destiny—a life struggle which is either “upwards
or downwards, with very uncertain footing.”490  No safe plateau of moral
security can ever be reached in this journey of life.491  Rather, painful
dilemmas of choice are the rule rather than the exception.  Perhaps, in
483 ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800(12), 127.805 (2005).
484 WASH. REV. CODE ANN., ch. 70,245 (West 2009); see Baxter v. Montana, 2008 Mont.
Dist. LEXIS 482 (Dec. 5, 2008) (holding a statutory right to assistance in dying was recog-
nized by the Montana Supreme Court in December, 2009); Kirk Johnson, Ruling by Montana
Supreme Court Bolsters Physician Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, January 1, 2010, at A17.
485 GRIFFITHS ET AL., supra note 62. R
486 See generally GEORGE P. SMITH, II, THE LAST RIGHT: EUTHANASIA, SUICIDE OR SELF-
DETERMINATION—ETHICAL, LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS (1999) (on file with au-
thor) (advocating an enlightened recognition of the right to die as one possibility in a spectrum
of options for patient care, focusing on the patient’s reasoning for the action desired) [SMITH,
THE LAST RIGHT] .
487 See generally SMITH, FINAL EXITS, supra note 48. R
488 See Smith, All’s Well That Ends Well, supra note 37.  Finding a moral similarity be- R
tween physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia, it has been argued that fairness re-
quires that if physician-assisted death is recognized legally, recognition must also be given to a
variant of active euthanasia which allows a patient—unable physically to commit physician-
assisted death or wishing to end his life by lethal injection but unable to self administer— to
rely upon, legally, an attending physician to act accordingly to end his suffering.  Nicholas
Dixon, On The Difference between Physician-Assisted Suicide and Active Euthanasia 28 HAS-
TINGS CTR. REP. 25 (1998).
489 GEORGE P. SMITH, II, WHEN MERCY SEASONS JUSTICE 21 (2007) (on file with author).
490 Minette Marrin, Opinion, An Acceptable Way to Arrange Our Death, THE SUNDAY
TIMES, May 14, 2006, at 18, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0.2088-
2179494.00.
491 Id.  Instead of being a rush toward moral oblivion, recognition of assisted dying may
well “be a step uphill to a better society” where a greater opportunity for deeper moral devel-
opment occurs and—consequently—fosters a more compassionate understanding of the end-
stage of life. CHARLES F. MCKANN, A TIME TO DIE: THE PLACE OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANCE
239, 240 (1999).
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reality, the “goal of the human moral effort” should be simply “to keep
seeing and drawing the line, and struggling to stay above it.”492
492 Marrin, supra note 490. R
